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INTRODUCTION 
It is possible for university coaches, staff, and administration to have done 
nothing wrong, even in light of an appearance of impropriety or allegations from 
student-athletes. It also is possible for university personnel to err, causing 
grievances by student-athletes to be valid. A university may have harbored 
transgressions that, once discovered, inspire student-athletes to band together to 
assert their common grievances. There are actual and rumored fake classes for 
student-athletes, child endangerment or abuse scandals occurring in university 
children’s programs, and alleged prostitution schemes under the guise of 
athletic recruitment.1 In all of those circumstances there is smoke—and 
sometimes fire. 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2017, by ROGER M. GROVES. 
 * Roger M. Groves is a tenured full professor at Florida Coastal School, 
former equity partner at Howard & Howard Attorneys, PC, and former tax judge. 
The author extends emphatic appreciation to stellar law students Phillip 
Bazemore, Roxanne Jackson, and Gwendolyn Belanger for their research 
assistance for this Article. 
 1. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) investigated 
alleged fake classes taken by scholarship football and basketball players at the 
University of North Carolina. See B. David Ridpath, North Carolina Releases 
NCAA’s Third, Yes Third, Notice of Allegations In Academic Fraud Case, FORBES 
SPORTS MONEY (Dec. 22, 2016, 4:18 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites 
/bdavidridpath/2016/12/22/north-carolina-releases-ncaas-third-yes-third-notice- 
of-allegations-in-academic-fraud-case/#6479a6e2d248 [https://perma.cc/87KU-
SAZV]. The NCAA severely sanctioned Pennsylvania State University for a 
child-abuse scandal, which involved former football coach Jerry Sandusky, and 
for the failures of administrators—including Graham Spanier, the former 
President of the university—to report the child abuse to the proper authorities. 
See Penn State Sanctions, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N (July 23, 2012, 
12:00 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/penn-state-
sanctions [https://perma.cc/QG69-HCAH]. Both Sandusky and Spanier were 
convicted for committing child endangerment crimes. See Sara Ganim & Evan 
Simko-Bednarski, Former Penn State President Spanier convicted in Sandusky 
case, CNN (Mar. 24, 2017, 11:23 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/24/us 
/former-penn-state-president-convicted/ [https://perma.cc/797U-YFWG]. The 
NCAA’s Committee on Infractions also has imposed severe penalties against the 
University of Louisville for providing escort services—including prostitutes—to 
basketball recruits. Marc Tracy, N.C.A.A. Places Louisville on Probation and 
Suspends Pitino, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06 
/15/sports/ncaabasketball/louisville-probation-rick-pitino-suspended-ncaa.html  
[https://perma.cc/T5R4-65BQ]. Louisville has appealed those findings. Associated 
Press, Louisville Appeals 'Draconian' NCAA Penalties in Escort Case, SPORTS 
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Thousands of former scholarship athletes already have joined together in 
a common grievance against the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(“NCAA”), the titular overseers of college sports.2 That grievance ripened 
into a presumptive class action lawsuit.3 The former scholarship athletes 
claimed that student-athletes should have received the actual cost of 
attendance as part of their scholarship, not just tuition and room and 
board.4 On February 3, 2017, the NCAA agreed to a proposed settlement 
of $208.7 million.5  
This Article does not focus on lawsuits, but on their precursors—the 
self-organizing activities by student-athletes. A few additional examples 
will illustrate the likelihood of future self-organizing activities by student-
athletes. Between 2011 and 2016, former college football players filed 11 
different lawsuits with concussion-related complaints, culminating in a 
settlement with the NCAA.6 Under the settlement, the NCAA will pay $70 
million—none of which compensates players for actual injuries.7 Future 
claims likely would be for compensation to student-athletes. Current 
scholarship athletes in one of those programs could advocate that players 
join forces to advocate for better concussion protocols on Facebook. 
Student-athletes also could attempt to broadcast on social media that the 
school ignored concussion protocols or that practices occurred in extreme 
                                                                                                             
ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2017/08/11 
/ap-bkc-louisville-escorts-ncaa-appeal [https://perma.cc/LZ4X-YM99]. 
 2. The NCAA is a voluntary unincorporated association of institutions of higher 
education. RAY YASSER ET AL., SPORTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 2–5 (5th ed. 
2003). 
 3. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust 
Litig., 311 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 4. See id. at 537. 
 5. Steve Berkowitz, NCAA to pay $208.7 million settlement over cost of 
attendance scholarships, USA TODAY (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com 
/story/sports/college/2017/02/03/ncaa-settlement-lawsuit-compensation-athletes-
cost-attendance-scholarships/97446676/ [https://perma.cc/2Q2R-5FQC].  
 6. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Student-Athlete Concussion 
Injury Litig., 314 F.R.D. 580 (N.D. Ill. 2016); see also Roger M. Groves, Coming 
To A College Near You: More Concussion Litgation, FORBES SPORTS MONEY (May 
25, 2016, 3:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogergroves/2016/05/25/more-
concussion-litigation-is-coming-and-probably-to-a-college-near-you/#2a14dafa3d 
35 [https://perma.cc/T588-95W9].  
 7. See Groves, supra note 6 (“Under the settlement, the NCAA will pay $70 
million to create a medical monitoring fund to screen current and former 
collegiate athletes for brain trauma. But no money was awarded to the former 
players. That is certainly the request this time.”).  
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weather conditions. These are additional examples of self-organizing 
activities. 
The mood of discontent goes beyond college football. Basketball 
players are aware and increasingly vocal about perceived revenue-sharing 
inequities. The University of Wisconsin made a deep run in the 2016 
NCAA Division 1 (“D-1”) Men’s Basketball Tournament—also known as 
March Madness.8 Nigel Hayes, the team’s most visible star, created a 
poster stating, “Broke College Athlete—Anything Helps.”9 He then 
directed donors to a Venmo account for contributions.10 In the 2017 
NCAA D-1 Men’s Basketball Tournament, even after a thrilling Elite 
Eight victory against the University of Kentucky en route to winning the 
National Championship, Theo Pinson, University of North Carolina’s 
most charismatic player, said in a postgame interview, “Hell of a game. 
We made a lot money for the NCAA today.”11 Both the University of 
North Carolina and the University of Wisconsin are public institutions, but 
student-athletes at private institutions at the D-1 level are likely to be as 
concerned about revenue-sharing and as likely to mobilize in the future to 
address any commonly viewed disparity.12 
Therefore, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that after next 
year’s March Madness, teams in the Final Four will form another type of 
team. Representative players could team up with some of Spotify’s top 
music artists like Drake, U2, the Weeknd, and Lady Gaga to create a song 
demanding a share of the $750 million paid to the NCAA from the NCAA 
D-1 Men’s Basketball Tournament.13 Perhaps those players will learn that 
                                                                                                             
 8. Wisconsin reached the regional semifinals in the 2016 NCAA Tournament 
before losing to Notre Dame, 61-56. NCAA Basketball Tournament History, ESPN, 
http://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/tournament/history/_/team1/8023  
(last visited Oct. 23, 2017) [https://perma.cc/3VM4-UGPB].  
 9. See Steven Hoffer, Wisconsin Badger Nigel Hayes Calls Out NCAA With 
‘Broke College Athlete’ Sign, HUFF. POST (Oct. 15, 2016, 3:34 PM), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/entry/nigel-hayes-espn-gameday-sign_us_580272bde4b06e 
0475953b48 [https://perma.cc/BS5S-PZ9P]. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Andrew Doughty, Theo Pinson: North Carolina’s Win Made A Lot of 
Money for the NCAA, HERO COLL. SPORTS NEWS (Mar. 27, 2017, 6:32 PM), 
http://herosports.com/news/north-carolina-final-four-theo-pinson-ncaa-ahah  
[https://perma.cc/AGB2-K4VV].  
 12. This Article focuses on labor laws and evolving regulations that impact 
the legal rights of student-athletes at private institutions. 
 13. For the fiscal year ending on August 31, 2016, the audited financial 
statements of the NCAA revealed that it accrued revenue from television and 
marketing rights fees of $797,918,223 from a total revenue of $989,113,084. The 
bulk of the media fees were from the single event—the NCAA D-1 Men’s 
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the single event has earned over 80% of the total NCAA revenue every 
year since 2006.14 
In consideration of the litany of student-athlete trepidations, a concern 
arises as to whether the school can promulgate social media rules in its 
handbook to prevent players from making comments on social media sites 
that could embarrass or tarnish the reputation of the NCAA or the schools 
from which they receive scholarships. This Article is an attempt to answer 
that concern, albeit through the lens of an unusual confluence of 
documents unique to sports law jurisprudence. Under new proclamations 
from the General Counsel’s Office of the National Labor Relations Board 
(“NLRB” or “the Board”), private institutions with scholarship athletes 
now will have a difficult time lawfully prohibiting those activities, 
requiring a new analytical construct to navigate applicable labor laws as 
applied to student-athletes. The underlying cause for the conversion is that 
student-athletes are transformed from being just students to being students 
and employees when they are required to devote more than typical full-
time employee hours under the control of the coaches without direct links 
to education.15  
The Article also resolves any issue regarding whether student-athletes 
engaging in social activism are protected under the National Labor 
                                                                                                             
Basketball Tournament. See Final Draft NCAA Financial Statements, NAT’L 
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N (Aug. 31, 2016), http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default 
t/files/2015-16NCAA_FinancialStatement_20170223.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FLT-
KJKK]; see also Brandy Shaul, Spotify Reveals Most Streamed Artists of 2016, 
ADWEEK (Dec. 2, 2016), http://www.adweek.com/digital/spotify-reveals-most-
streamed-artists-of-2016/ [https://perma.cc/CAN5-3DN7]. 
 14. See Revenue, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www 
.ncaa.org/about/resources/finances/revenue (last visited Apr. 15, 2016) [https://per 
ma.cc/YU2N-E3Z7]; see also Roger M. Groves, A Solution for the Pay for Play 
Dilemma of College Athletes: A Novel Compensation Structure Tethered to 
Amateurism and Education, 17 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 101, 112 (2016). 
 15. The question of university control and volume of student hours in the 
sport is relevant to whether labor laws apply to those student-athletes. That 
question was addressed by an NLRB hearing officer in Nw. Univ. and Coll. 
Athletics Players Ass’n, 2014-15 N.L.R.B. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15781 (Mar. 26, 2014). 
The hearing officer found that the players spent 50–60 hours a week on football 
duties during the football season, “while only spending about 20 hours per week 
attending classes.” Id. at 18. The full Board reviewed the hearing officer’s 
decision in making its final decision but declined to decide the case on the merits. 
The Board’s decision included the hearing officer’s decision in its appendix. Nw. 
Univ. and Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Aug. 17, 2015). 
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Relations Act (“NLRA” or “Act”).16 The question percolates into a ripe 
legal issue when private colleges promulgate rules that prohibit or interfere 
with a student-athlete’s speech. Stated differently, the question asks 
whether there are circumstances in which social activism overlaps so 
significantly with self-organizing activities for mutual protection that the 
protections of Section 7 of the NLRA17 extend to the social activism. If the 
scholarship athletes are students in private D-1 institutions, the answer, 
surprisingly, is “yes” in some circumstances, and rules restricting players’ 
speech are unfair labor practices.18  
There is a “New Age Athlete” in our midst, with increased business 
acumen and the audacity to display it through the lens of sports. Some 
athletes focus on pecuniary aspects of the sports industry that give rise to 
the revenue-sharing issues noted above.19 Others feel a social 
responsibility to use sports as a platform to communicate issues deemed 
far more important than their points on the court or the field. The latter 
form of activism has its tradeoffs. An athlete choosing to use his relative 
fame to publicize social issues faces a public scrutiny likely not faced by 
those who remain silent. Yet, the failure to act on a strongly held belief 
can create a sense of isolation. Those athletes face an internal struggle akin 
to others who have a platform derived from something other than sports, 
such as a political figure. The excerpt below is the extemporaneous 
response of pre-presidential Barack Obama to a question about whether 
being biracial and bicultural gives him a “lingering sense” of isolation:  
What I discovered . . . is that . . . the solution for me to that sense 
of isolation was to throw myself into a community to basically 
decide . . . that my individual fate had to be tied to something 
larger than myself. That my individual salvation would only come 
                                                                                                             
 16. Congress created the Act in 1939 to protect the rights of employees to 
bargain collectively and curtail certain private sector management practices, 
which can harm the general welfare of workers. National Labor Relations Act, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012). 
 17. Section 7 of the Act authorizes the right of employees to “self-organiz[e], 
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities 
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” § 157. 
This Article asserts that self-organizing activities can include joint social media 
posts in addition to other actions designed for their mutual aid or protection. 
 18. See The Trustees of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y. and Graduate 
Workers of Columbia-GWC, UAW, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 23, 2016); 
RICHARD F. GRIFFIN, JR., NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., MEMORANDUM GC 17-
01 (Jan. 31, 2017) [hereinafter MEMORANDUM GC 17-01]. 
 19. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text. 
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from a collective salvation of some sort; that my true sense of self 
would only come if I had some sense of community. And so what 
I internally . . . did was to reach back into that period of . . . the 
civil rights movement and . . . I internalized a sense that this . . .  
nation had in the early 60’s, that we could transform community, 
that we could break isolation.20 
Many current student-athletes likely experience a different sort of 
isolation. To the extent student-athletes are viewed and defined solely 
through sports, they live in a cocoon, seemingly and unwittingly precluded 
from intelligent public articulation on any other subject. Athletes who 
participate in social activism choose to defy that convention. They choose 
instead to tie their fate to a group experiencing some hardship or injustice. 
Their sense of “community” extends to athletic teammates and beyond. 
This mindset is the root of self-organizing activity protected by Section 7 
of the Act. Risking the loss of their athletic scholarships to band together 
against a perceived inequity at the university speaks to their willingness to 
give up the athlete-only tag.  
Regardless of the cause championed by players, social media is a 
growing platform for expression. The NLRB operates with a broad 
definition of social media.21 The Board’s recent pronouncements have 
                                                                                                             
 20. After publishing Dreams from My Father in 1995, Barack Obama 
commented on his book at a Cambridge, Massachusetts library event. See 22-
CityView-Cambridge, MA, From the Vault – Barack Obama September 1995, 
YOUTUBE (Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w5JlqDnoqlo 
[https://perma.cc /534P-QPNL]. After President Obama stated the above 
quotation, he further discussed his isolation theme, stating that both his black, 
African-born father and his Caucasian, American-born mother subconsciously 
strove to break the cultural isolation by forging a relationship that defied 
convention. Timer: 56:42. Similarly, he said that freedom riders going south for 
voter registration in a region beyond their prior experience is an exercise in 
breaking through isolation. He ends by stating, “I remain optimistic about 
America. I believe that we can appeal to the better angels of our nature.” Timer 
34:46. He articulated that same optimism in his last press conference as President 
of the United States.  
 21. The NLRB has stated that social media includes “various online 
technology tools that enable people to communicate easily via the internet to share 
information and resources. These tools can encompass text, audio, video, images, 
podcasts, and other multimedia communications.” LAFE E. SOLOMON, ACTING 
GENERAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, at 1 (Aug. 18, 2011). The 
memorandum analyzed Facebook posts, tweets, and other platforms. Id. 
Presumably, social media includes blogs, forums, wikis, social and professional 
networks, virtual worlds, and user-generated video or audio.  
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added a legal minefield to social media policies—raising issues about the 
ability of private colleges and universities to prohibit certain social media 
expressions and activities by the scholarship student-athletes.22 This 
Article examines those issues and offers conceptual models and practical 
guidance on what schools can prohibit and, conversely, when the United 
States’ labor laws protect self-organizing activities of student-athletes.  
Litigation analyzed below leads to the following conclusion: student-
athletes are “employees” of their university “employer.” Therefore, the 
NLRA limits the ability of schools to prohibit or interfere with self-
organizing speech and activities of student-athletes.  
Part I of this Article provides an overview of applicable NLRB 
authorities relevant to how private schools at the highest level, D-1, can 
regulate the speech and activities of their athletes.23 Part I also examines a 
line of cases that take a tortured route to a pronouncement from the NLRB 
Office of the General Counsel. Part II analyzes the General Counsel 
Memorandum (“GCM”) and its application to student-athletes. Part III is 
devoted to fascinating legal distinctions and nuances articulated by the Board 
and General Counsel. In Part IV, the Article explores how an Advice 
Memorandum from an NLRB Regional Director can invalidate entire sections 
of a university’s policies regarding student-athletes. Part V sets out various 
hypotheticals that expand on existing circumstances to illustrate when social 
protests and activism are a protected activity under the Act. Part VI of the 
Article provides a best practices model for affected universities to respond to 
the newly established relationship between institutions and student-athletes. 
The Article concludes in Part VII with the futuristic application of employee 
status to categories of students beyond athletes and the repercussions rippling 
through academia’s private institutions.  
I. THE STATE OF THE NLRB LAW ON STUDENT-ATHLETE REGULATION 
There are three stages to the NLRB decisions on the issue of employee 
status for scholarship student-athletes at private D-1 institutions. The issue 
                                                                                                             
 22. The scope of this article is limited to scholarship athletes because only 
scholarship athletes challenged Northwestern University’s policies. See supra 
note 15. 
 23. The NCAA generally describes D-1 schools as those with “the biggest 
student bodies, manage the largest athletics budgets and offer the most generous 
number of scholarships.” Division 1, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http: 
//www.ncaa.org/about?division=d1 (last visited Aug. 9, 2017) [https://perma.cc 
/MCA2-9W34].  
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first was decided on the merits by an NLRB administrative law judge.24 
The Board then decided the matter was outside its jurisdiction.25 
Thereafter, the General Counsel for the Board decided to revisit the 
substantive issues on the merits.26 The result culminated with seemingly 
definitive guidance to all private institutions at the highest level of sports.  
The precise relationship between student-athletes and private institutions 
came to the legal battleground through a surprising source: football players at 
Northwestern University (“Northwestern”) requesting legal status as 
“employees” under the NLRA.27 Northwestern is a private institution, and 
privately owned entities fall under the jurisdiction of the NLRA and the 
NLRB.28  
Four published matters either directly or indirectly involve Northwestern 
essentially as a lead defendant. Comprehensively, the published matters 
provide background for understanding the changing landscape of the student-
athlete relationship with private institutions. The published matters appear in 
the following chronological order: (1) a decision by an NLRB hearing 
officer or Regional Director;29 (2) the appeal of that decision to the full 
NLRB Board;30 (3) an NLRB Advice Memorandum from a Regional 
Director regarding Handbook policies;31 and (4) a Memorandum by the 
NLRB Office of the General Counsel.32 The first two matters concern only 
whether the Northwestern players were statutory employees under the 
NLRA in a “representation” case, in which the students sought to form a 
bargaining unit and have a union election.33 The Advice Memorandum 
assumes student-athletes have employee status and opines on the legality 
                                                                                                             
 24. See discussion infra Part I.A. The NLRB also uses the term “hearing 
officer” to describe those who hear the evidence and make decisions prior to a 
final decision from the Board. 
 25. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 26. MEMORANDUM GC 17-01, supra note 18. 
 27. See Nw. Univ. and Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 
(Aug. 17, 2015). 
 28. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012) (excluding the state or federal governments or 
any subdivision thereof from the statutory definition of employer under the NLRA).  
 29. Nw. Univ. and Coll. Athletics Players Ass’n, 2014-15 N.L.R.B. Dec. 
(CCH) ¶ 15781 (Mar. 26, 2014). 
 30. Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167. 
 31. Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Div. of 
Advice at the Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. to Peter Sung Ohr, Reg’l Dir. (Sept. 22, 
2016) [hereinafter Advice Memorandum]. 
 32. MEMORANDUM GC 17-01, supra note 18. 
 33. See Nw. Univ., 2014-15 N.L.R.B. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15781; Nw. Univ., 362 
N.L.R.B. No. 167.  
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of Northwestern’s Handbook as it relates to student-athletes.34 The GCM 
provides guidance to all private institutions on whether student workers in 
various categories qualify for employee status.35  
All of these matters form a complex legal web. That matrix will 
challenge drafters of rules and policies designed to regulate social media 
expressions and actions of student-athletes. The plot thickens around issues 
that the institution would rather suppress.  
A. Preliminary Decision Granting Employee Status to Student-Athletes 
The first matter involves Northwestern University scholarship football 
players who claimed they were statutory employees under the NLRA.36 A 
hearing officer agreed, stating that the athletes fall within the broad 
definition of an employee, which is defined as a person “who performs 
services for another under a contract of hire, subject to the other’s control 
. . . and in return for payment.”37 The hearing officer detailed various ways 
in which the coaches “have control over nearly every aspect of the players’ 
private lives by virtue of . . . many rules that they must follow under threat 
of discipline and/or the loss of scholarship.”38 The hearing officer also 
found that playing football was a service “in exchange for the compensation 
set forth in their ‘tender’ [a/k/a grant-in-aid or scholarship].”39  
B. Full Board Decision: The Jurisdictional Wink and Nod  
The second matter is the full NLRB Board decision that reviewed the 
hearing officer’s decision.40 Rather than endorse the hearing officer’s 
decision or decide the issue on the merits, the Board used its discretion to 
decline to assert jurisdiction.41 The Board succinctly stated its rationale: 
Our decision is primarily premised on the finding that, because of the 
nature of sports leagues (namely the control exercised by the leagues 
over the individual teams) and the composition and structure of 
                                                                                                             
 34. See Advice Memorandum, supra note 31. 
 35. MEMORANDUM GC 17-01, supra note 18. 
 36. Nw. Univ., 2014-15 N.L.R.B. Dec. ¶ 15781 (Mar. 26, 2014). 
 37. Id. at 13 (citing Brown Univ. & Int’l. Union et al., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 490 
n.27 (2004)). 
 38. Id. at 16.  
 39. Id. at 18.  
 40. See Nw. Univ. and Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Aug. 
17, 2015). 
 41. Id. at 1.  
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[Football Bowl Subdivision (“FBS”)] football (in which the 
overwhelming majority of competitors are public colleges and 
universities over which the Board cannot assert jurisdiction), it would 
not promote stability in labor relations to assert jurisdiction in this 
case.42 
The underlying reason a decision on the merits would not promote stability 
in labor relations is that employee status for only private institutions 
creates an inconsistent status for the college football industry at the highest 
level—D-1 FBS. The Board emphasized that “of the roughly 125 colleges 
and universities that participate in FBS football, all but 17 are [public] 
state-run institutions.”43 The Board further noted that Northwestern is the 
only private school in the Big Ten Conference “and thus the Board cannot 
assert jurisdiction over any of Northwestern’s primary competitors.”44 The 
Board, therefore, was reluctant to unwittingly create greater burdens for 
the conference private institutions than the public institutions. Such a 
public-private divide within the Big Ten Conference likely would have 
implications for all of college football. 
The Board then concluded that although there were “other contexts” 
in which a decision on employee status helped “promote uniformity and 
stability,” an employee status for the student-athletes of the only private 
school within the Big Ten, and for the student-athletes of only 17 of the 
125 schools in FBS football, actually would promote a lack of uniformity 
and stability.45 In the Board’s words, the existing FBS public-private 
divide is “an inherent asymmetry.”46 The Board also noted its legal 
authority to use its discretion in declining jurisdiction, even though the 
Board could have heard the case.47  
Assuming jurisdiction and rendering a decision is preferable for the 
litigants. A decision would have provided clarity in the relationship 
between student-athletes and the schools for which they play football. As 
will be noted below, the NLRB’s thinking evolved on this issue to come 
to the same conclusion.48 
                                                                                                             
 42. Id. at 3. 
 43. Id. at 5. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at 2 n.3 (“[W]e are exercising our discretion to decline jurisdiction in 
this case . . . .”). 
 48. The Board relegated an important point to a footnote. See id. at 4 n.9. The 
Board chose to assert jurisdiction in several other cases that had both private and 
public employers. In footnote 9, the Board cited Big East Conference, 282 
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Although the above language clearly states why the Board refused to 
exercise jurisdiction, the Board also clearly stated the narrow scope of the 
decision. The Board did not determine that the hearing officer erred in 
holding that the Northwestern players were statutory employees. The 
Board premised its conclusion and rationale on the carefully worded 
precursor, “even if the scholarship players were statutory employees 
(which, again, is an issue we do not decide) . . . .”49 Similarly, the Board 
stated that there is no material error in the factual findings of the Hearing 
Officer, also known as the Regional Director.50 In the Board’s words, “The 
Regional Director’s factual findings appear, in the main, to be fully 
supported by the record.”51 And the Board clearly stated that it chose not 
to scrutinize the legal conclusions of the hearing officer because it declined 
to exercise jurisdiction.52 Thus, the Board did not find material errors of 
fact or law in the hearing officer’s conclusion that Northwestern student-
athletes were employees.53  
In fact, the implication is that the Board agreed with the finding. If the 
Board examined the merits and decided against the employee status, there 
would be uniformity in labor relations—that is, all student-athletes playing 
for a private or public school would have the same status of “non-
employees.” Only a decision to classify the private school athletes as 
employees would create the incongruity. A careful reading of the Board’s 
decision therefore provides an unofficial “wink and nod” to employee 
status without expressing it directly.  
Finally, the Board’s rationale for denying jurisdiction narrows its 
precedential value. The Board suggests that a change in circumstances 
                                                                                                             
N.L.R.B. 335, 340–42 (Dec. 1, 1986). Id. In that case, the conference was an 
independent private entity, even though two of the schools within the conference 
were public institutions. The Board, nonetheless, asserted jurisdiction. In 
Northwestern University, however, the Board distinguished Big East Conference. 
It stated that the public members “could not control the conference’s operations.” 
Id. at 6. This “control” test was shown as precedent for making jurisdictional 
decisions. The Board also noted that at least two states—Ohio and Michigan—
have barred state-supported public college athletes from public employee 
classification via legislation. Id. The Board apparently had no evidence that the 
bifurcation was detrimental to the Big Ten Conference. The lack of uniformity, 
therefore, was not nearly as important as rendering decisions on the merits for 
plaintiffs with issues ripe for adjudication.  
 49. Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
 50. Id. at 2 n.3. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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could be cause for asserting jurisdiction in the future.54 The Board first admits 
that the fundamental premise of its denial was the interrelatedness of the 
NCAA, school conferences, and the schools within the conferences.55 The 
Board observed that “[j]ust as the nature of league sports and the NCAA’s 
oversight renders individual team bargaining problematic, the way that FBS 
football itself is structured and the nature of the colleges and universities 
involved strongly suggest that asserting jurisdiction in this case would not 
promote stability in labor relations.”56  
In other words, a significant reason for declining jurisdiction is that 
the inherent NCAA oversight over the college sports industry is anathema 
to “single team” bargaining.57 The Board admitted that its decision could 
change if the NCAA relationship with the individual schools changed. 
There are two particular passages of relevance. In the first passage, the 
Board States,  
As a final note, the Board’s decision not to assert jurisdiction does 
not preclude a reconsideration of this issue in the future. For 
example, if the circumstances of Northwestern’s players or FBS 
football change such that the underpinnings of our conclusions 
regarding jurisdiction warrant reassessment, the Board may revisit 
its policy in this area.58  
The Board likely knew of the highly publicized line of cases challenging 
the legal relationship of the NCAA and the student-athletes under antitrust 
law. The lead case, O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 
is the largest class action suit by students to reach a federal court and be 
                                                                                                             
 54. Id. at 6 (“We note that our decision to decline jurisdiction in this case is 
based on the facts in the record before us, and that subsequent changes in the 
treatment of scholarship players could outweigh the considerations that motivate 
our decision today.”). 
 55. Id. at 5 (“Other industries, however, are not characterized by the degree 
of interrelationship present among and between teams in a sports league.”). 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. at 4–5. The Board reaffirmed that point in footnote 15. “To be clear, 
we are not suggesting that the NCAA’s control over many of the terms and 
conditions . . . is an independent reason to decline to assert jurisdiction. We merely 
observe that bargaining in a single-team unit will not promote labor stability in 
this case.” Id. at 4 n.15. The Board did not define the term “single-team unit,” but 
the obvious reference is to a matter confined to a single institution, such as 
Northwestern and its team, not a matter designed to cover all of the Big Ten 
Conference teams. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 58. Id. at 6 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
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decided on the merits.59 The Board’s second passage forewarns of a possibly 
changed relationship, though, again, it refuses to cite the authority. As stated 
by the Board, “[R]ecent changes, as well as calls for additional reforms, 
suggest that the situation of scholarship players may well change in the near 
future.”60 
These limitations to the breadth and scope of the Board’s jurisdictional denial 
provide the opportunity for the NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel to revisit 
the question of student-athletes’ status, including whether Northwestern’s 
Handbook policies, which regulate student-athlete expressions through social 
media and other activities, are unlawful under the NLRA. 
II. THE GENERAL COUNSEL MEMORANDUM   
The Board’s jurisdictional denial discussed above was not the end of 
student-athletes claims in large part because of a GCM that revived the 
claims on the merits. 
A. Background and the Return to Established Precedent 
The GCM, in conjunction with a separate Advice Memorandum from an 
NLRB Regional Director, has changed the legal landscape in this area. The 
Board declined to assert jurisdiction over the case designed to decide whether 
student-athletes at Northwestern were employees.61 Yet the NLRB General 
Counsel issued a memorandum, the GCM, which stated that various types of 
student workers in higher education are employees for NLRB purposes.62 
To evaluate this GCM in a vacuum understates its impact. To appreciate 
the memorandum’s value, it is necessary to understand the cases that preceded 
it and the subtle forecasting emanating from those cases regarding the future 
relationship between college students and their institutions. The GCM also 
is important—perhaps even more important than any single NLRB case—
because of its ambitious scope and breadth. The next section of this Article 
discusses that issue. 
The General Counsel’s rationale for reopening the student-athlete 
issue after the jurisdictional denial is rooted in NLRB precedent. It cannot 
be overstated that although the employee designation is relatively new and 
robustly disruptive to the college sports industry, linkage to precedent was 
the basis for making the determination.63 One succinct passage notes the 
                                                                                                             
 59. See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 60. Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 6. 
 61. Id. at 1. 
 62. MEMORANDUM GC 17-01, supra note 18.  
 63. See infra notes 64–69 and accompanying text. 
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policy and history of Board interpretations of the NLRA: “In applying the 
NLRA’s expansive language and purpose to specific situations, the Board has 
long made use of common law agency rules governing the conventional 
master-servant relationship.”64 The General Counsel then reiterated the 
applicable legal standard for determining the legal status of the Northwestern 
scholarship athletes. According to the rules, “an employee includes any 
person ‘who perform[s] services for another and [is] subject to the other’s 
control or right of control. Consideration, i.e. payment, is strongly 
indicative of employee status.’”65  
As it relates to student-athletes, the General Counsel relied primarily 
on two cases, Boston Medical Center and Columbia University, as 
controlling precedent.66 The General Counsel’s examination of the 
evidentiary record in Northwestern University brought the conclusion that 
student-athletes did perform services for their college—playing football—
in return for compensation through the grant-in-aid, also known as the 
scholarship.67 The General Counsel also concluded that the student-
athletes were under the college’s control “from the time they wake up until 
the appointed hour that they go to sleep.”68 As such, those student-athletes 
are statutory employees under the Act.69  
B. Scope and Breadth 
Two primary reasons show why strong adherence to precedent was 
important. First, the General Counsel chose a potentially dangerous task—
providing guidance on the merits of an issue after the Board already 
refused to adjudicate a case involving that same issue. Second, he chose 
to expand the scope and, therefore, the significance of the guidance. 
Instead of ruling on one school matter, he elected to provide guidance for 
all D-1 private schools.70 This pronouncement was neither an internal 
memorandum to himself nor an advisory letter with a disclaimer that it 
was unofficial or for discussion purposes only. Rather, the Memorandum 
was to “all Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident 
                                                                                                             
 64. MEMORANDUM GC 17-01, supra note 18, at 18 (emphasis added). 
 65. Id. (emphasis added). 
 66. Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999) (internal citations 
omitted); The Trustees of Columbia Univ. and Graduate Workers of Columbia-
GWC, UAW, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 23, 2016).  
 67. MEMORANDUM GC 17-01, supra note 18, at 19–20.  
 68. Id. at 20  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 2. 
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Officers.”71 The General Counsel, therefore, provided direction to 
virtually every preliminary decision-maker within the NLRB. A solid legal 
foundation should exist for such a quest.  
Regarding the scope of the GCM, the General Counsel examined 
various disputes involving what he termed “non-academic student 
employees.”72 His obvious purpose was to provide comprehensive 
guidance in a single document on how to treat the issue of students as 
employees at institutions of higher learning. As stated in the 
Memorandum, “This Report is intended as a guide for employers, labor 
unions, and employees that summarizes Board law regarding NLRA 
employee status in the university setting and explains how the Office of 
the General Counsel will apply these representational decisions in the 
unfair labor practice arena.”73  
Therefore, the GCM provides guidance to all interested parties to the 
dispute while attempting to add predictability in decision-making because 
every preliminary decision-maker must follow the same legal standard. 
The GCM thereby should further stability in labor relations.  
These pronouncements are far from perfunctory. After discussing the 
substance of the GCM, this Article explains how the GCM rather 
ingenuously justified tackling the issue on the merits despite the Board’s 
decision to do the opposite. Skillfully, yet subtly and respectfully, the 
General Counsel provided the answer to why jurisdiction should exist. He 
made the case for increased stability in labor relations, countering the 
Board’s basis for rejection of the case in Northwestern University.  
C. Substantive Guidance on Treatment of Student-Athletes as Employees 
Under the Act 
The discussion below illustrates just how quickly student-athlete labor 
law jurisprudence involving student-athletes is evolving. This section 
examines foundational cases, followed by an examination of how decisions 
have rejected institutional attempts to exclude educational institutions from 
the scope of the NLRB. Finally, this section focuses on the most recent case 
findings that the nature of the relationship of student-athletes to their 
respective institutions is more economic than educational. 
                                                                                                             
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1. 
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1. Foundational Cases  
The chronology of decisions is noteworthy. The Board’s rejection of 
jurisdiction in Northwestern University was in August 2015.74 That 
decision narrowly involved the application of the NLRA to student-
athletes in a representation case. One year later, the Board decided The 
Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York and Graduate 
Workers of Columbia-GWC, UAW (“Columbia University”), which involved 
graduate students who, like student-athletes, were not regarded previously by 
the university as “employees” under labor laws.75 Specifically, the Board 
overturned Brown University, a 2004 decision, and determined that graduate 
student-assistants were employees under the NLRA.76 Although the 
aggrieved student-assistants in Columbia University primarily were 
graduate students, at no point in the opinion did the Board exclude 
undergraduates or scholarship athletes from possibly receiving employee 
status. In fact, the Board specifically granted bargaining unit status to a 
group that included undergraduate students.77 
After deciding Columbia University, the General Counsel arrived at 
the same conclusion a mere six months later in January 2017. His GCM 
gave broad application to the 2016 decision in Columbia University. The 
GCM characterized Columbia University as an “important representation 
decision directly impacting unfair labor practice case processing . . . .”78  
The GCM emphasized that Columbia University was the culmination of 
nearly two decades of decisions in the educational arena.79 The overarching 
issue in Columbia University was whether doctoral and student-assistants 
with teaching and research duties for pay are statutory employees as defined 
in Section 2(3) of the NLRA.80 The Board first observed that Section 2(3) is 
very broad. In the Board’s words, “‘[t]he term “employee” shall include any 
employee,’ subject to certain exceptions—none of which address students 
employed by their universities.”81 The Board then affirmed that exercising 
jurisdiction over a student worker issue is within the congressional intent 
                                                                                                             
 74. See Nw. Univ. and Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Aug. 
17, 2015).  
 75. The Trustees of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y. and Graduate 
Workers of Columbia-GWC, UAW, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 23, 2016). 
 76. Id. at 1; see also Brown Univ. & Int’l. Union et al., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 
(July 13, 2004).  
 77. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 2. 
 78. MEMORANDUM GC 17-01, supra note 18, at 10.  
 79. See id. at 10–16. 
 80. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 6. 
 81. Id. at 7. 
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and federal labor policy.82 The Board stated that the federal policy is to 
“encourage” collective bargaining and “protect” the right of workers to 
“full freedom to express choice[s]” about their representatives.83 The 
Board decided that “[p]ermitting student assistants to choose whether they 
wish to engage in collective bargaining—not prohibiting it—would further 
the Act’s policies.”84 Because there are already 64,000 unionized student-
assistants at 28 public universities, in addition to NYU, a private 
institution, this issue is ripe and in need of consistent and comprehensive 
treatment among affected institutions.85 
The Board applied the common law definition of “employee” to 
doctoral students in two categories: doctoral students with teaching duties 
and doctoral students with research duties.86 In both cases, the Board found 
that the “student workers” fell within the definition of “employee.”87 
Regarding research assistants, the Board stated that “where a university 
exerts the requisite control over the research assistant’s work, and specific 
work is performed as a condition of receiving the financial award, a 
research assistant is properly treated as an employee under the Act.” 88 
In Columbia University, the Board also was clear in articulating the 
source of their discontent—the Board’s prior decision in Brown 
University.89 In Brown University, the Board held that graduate student-
assistants were not employees because their role was an integral part of 
their education at the institution and that collective bargaining is a concept 
“‘largely foreign to higher education.’”90 The Board emphasized that the 
supervised teaching or research was “an integral component of their 
academic development.”91 In Columbia University, the Board concluded 
that its error in Brown University was in improperly framing the test.92 The 
test is not whether the student-school relationship was “primarily” more 
educational than economic.93 That test implies an either-or analysis. The 
appropriate test is to determine whether the economic relationship exists 
                                                                                                             
 82. Id. at 6. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. at 7.  
 85. Id. at 10.  
 86. Id. at 14. 
 87. Id. at 12. 
 88. Id. at 17. 
 89. Brown Univ. & Int’l. Union et al., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (July 13, 2004). 
 90. Id. at 490. 
 91. Id. at 483.  
 92. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 5. 
 93. Id. at 3. 
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at all.94 The Board stated that being paid is the focus and that student-
assistants “who perform work at the direction of their university for which 
they are compensated are statutory employees.”95 The Board reasoned 
further that this “view better comports with the language of Section 2(3) 
of the Act and common law agency principles, the clear policy of the Act, 
and the relevant empirical evidence.”96 The fact that the relationship exists 
within academia is not dispositive. Therefore, the Board concluded that an 
employment relationship still can exist within an educational environment.97 
The Board stated that “[w]e can discern no such policies that speak to 
whether a common law employee should be excluded from the Act 
because his or her employment relationship co-exists with an educational 
or other non-economic relationship.”98 
The General Counsel carefully distinguished the prior non-employee 
cases, returning to prior precedent that found employee status for various 
classes of student workers.99 The case chronology and summary of 
significant cases is below.100  
 
Case/Year Student Category 
Statutory 
Employee Status? 
Boston Medical 
Center Corporation, 1999. 
Interns, Residents, Fellows at 
Nonprofit Teaching Hospital 
Yes 
New York University, 
2000 
Graduate Student-Assistants Yes 
Brown University, 
(2004) 
Graduate Student-Assistants No 
Columbia University, 
2016 
Doctoral Students (Teaching 
Fellow or Research Assistants) 
Yes 
 
This chart clarifies that at the time of drafting the GCM, the weight of 
authority actually favored statutory employee status for a range of students. 
No cases, however, concerned student-athletes. Of course, that observation 
begs the question of whether the underlying legal theory allowing those 
groups of students to obtain employee status also allows student-athletes to be 
classified as employees.  
                                                                                                             
 94. Id. at 5.  
 95. Id. at 4. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. at 17. 
 98. Id. at 6.  
 99. Id. at 2–17. 
 100. The cases of decisional significance as cited in the GCM are Bos. Med. 
Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (Nov. 26, 1999); N.Y. Univ. & Int’l Union et al., 
332 N.L.R.B. 1205 (Oct. 31, 2000); Brown Univ. & Int’l. Union et al., 342 
N.L.R.B. 483 (July 13, 2004); Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90.  
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The GCM addresses that question with a two-pronged analysis: rejecting 
an educational exemption as advocated by the institutions and then applying 
a common law Master-Servant test101 to determine if an economic 
relationship exists within the educational environment.102 If the economic 
relationship exists, the Board should find an employee status.  
2. Rejection of the Educational Exclusion 
The above chart was created to highlight that among the primary cases 
analyzed by the General Counsel, only Brown University found against 
employee status for the students at issue. The GCM exposed the 
underlying legal premise of that case. In the General Counsel’s view, “The 
crux of the Brown majority’s decision was that graduate assistants are not 
employees because they are primarily students and have a primarily 
educational, not economic, relationship with the university.”103  
The GCM then notes that in New York University, the Board rejected 
this educational exception theory.104 The General Counsel summarized 
New York University by stating that “[t]he NYU Board also rejected the 
argument that graduate assistants should be denied the Act’s protection 
because their work is ‘primarily educational’ and instead explained that 
‘obtain[ing] educational benefits from employment is not inconsistent with 
employee status.’”105 
The GCM then highlighted the analytic link between Boston Medical 
Center and Columbia University, despite the cases being nearly two decades 
apart. The General Counsel considered the cases “strikingly similar” and 
found that Section 2(3) of the NLRA is intentionally broad in scope, without 
listing students among its exclusions.106 That provision states in relevant part 
that “[t]he term ‘employee’ shall include any employee . . . and shall not be 
                                                                                                             
 101. The Master Servant relationship is the circumstance in which the master 
typically has nearly complete authority over the manner, place, and time of the 
servant’s services on behalf of the master. See Master and Servant, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 102. Although the General Counsel did not say so specifically, the analysis 
appears to be two-pronged. Logically, the educational exemption issue is a threshold 
question because if it exists, the fact-specific common law test is moot.  
 103. MEMORANDUM GC 17-01, supra note 18, at 11 (citing Brown Univ., 342 
N.L.R.B. at 487). 
 104. Id. at 10. 
 105. Id. at 10–11.  
 106. Id. at 15 (citing Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 160 (Nov. 26, 
1999)). 
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limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Act [provides an 
exclusion].”107  
The GCM further states that the definition of “employee” is “strikingly” 
broad, covering “any person who works for another in return for financial or other 
compensation.”108 To erase any doubt as to congressional intent, the General 
Counsel said, “Section 2(3) contains only a few enumerated exceptions, and 
university employees, football players, and students are not among them.”109 It 
is unclear whether the General Counsel viewed the institutional educational 
exemption argument as being one as a matter of law. If so, institutions will 
have difficulty establishing a factual basis to alter the General Counsel’s 
conclusion that university employees, football players, and students are 
outside of the institutional educational exemption.  
3. Finding the Relationship More Economic than Educational 
Having disposed of the blanket educational exemption argument, the 
General Counsel relied upon the precedent of Boston Medical Center and 
Columbia University to determine whether students who work for an 
institution are employees under the Act. In both cases, the Board applied 
the common law Master-Servant test and found that students who provide 
“services” for an educational institution and receive “compensation” in 
return meet the standard.110 Importantly, the substance of the activity is 
determinative, not the label used to describe services or compensation.111 
Therefore, the term “stipend” for patient observation and care did not 
foreclose the employee status in Boston Medical Center.112  
The General Counsel clearly sought to provide muscularity to Boston 
Medical Center. He highlighted the fact that when a party asked the Board 
to reconsider the case in light of the contrary decision in Brown University, 
the Board said, “Boston Medical Center has been the law for over a 
decade, and no court of appeals has questioned its validity.”113 
                                                                                                             
 107. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).  
 108. MEMORANDUM GC 17-01, supra note 18, at 12 (citing The Trustees of 
Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y. and Graduate Workers of Columbia-GWC, 
UAW, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 4). 
 109. Id. at 18. 
 110. See id. at 10–16.  
 111. See id. at 19–23 (discussing the nature of the student’s services) (internal 
quotations omitted); Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (discussing the 
elements of the services of the interns, residents, and fellows).  
 112. Id. at 15. 
 113. Id. at 15–16; see also Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152. 
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The majority of these cases, therefore, conclude that the label of 
“student” does not exclude students automatically from being employees. 
Therein is the legal link to the hearing officer’s decision in Northwestern 
University, albeit before the Board refused to exercise jurisdiction as a 
final decision.  
D. Application of Precedent to Student-Athletes 
The GCM provided guidance on various categories of students who 
also worked for the university. The General Counsel devoted a separate 
section to the analysis of student-athletes.114 Consistent with prior cases, 
his inquiry was whether the student-school relationship was like other 
commercial-economic relationships with a “sufficiently substantial effect 
on commerce.”115  
The GCM applied the common law test, that is, whether the students 
“perform services for their colleges and the NCAA, subject to their control, 
in return for compensation.”116 The GCM detailed various factual findings 
from the hearing officer’s decision in Northwestern University, evidencing a 
primarily economic relationship between Northwestern and its scholarship 
football players.117 Based on the evidentiary record in Northwestern 
University, the General Counsel came to the same conclusion: Northwestern 
football student-athletes on scholarship “clearly satisfy the broad Section 2(3) 
definition of employee and the common law test for statutory employees.”118  
Facts of decisional significance include substantial evidence that the 
players received significant compensation—up to $76,000 per year—for as 
many as five years in exchange for their football “services.”119 The General 
Counsel also emphasized that there was ample evidentiary support for the 
factual conclusion that the school controlled numerous facets of the players’ 
daily lives, “from the time they wake up until the appointed hour that they go 
to sleep.”120 The GCM included that element of control in the rationale for 
                                                                                                             
 114. Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 16. 
 115. Id. at 17 (citing the Board’s jurisdictional rejection in Nw. Univ., 362 
N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 6 n. 28 (Aug. 17, 2015)).  
 116. MEMORANDUM GC 17-01, supra note 18, at 19 (emphasis added). 
 117. Id. at 19. 
 118. Id. at 20. 
 119. Id. at 19. 
 120. Id. at 19–20. 
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finding that the athletes fell within the common law definition of an 
employee.121  
III. GCM RATIONALE FOR WHY GUIDANCE ON STUDENT-ATHLETE 
STATUS IS AUTHORIZED DESPITE PRIOR BOARD DENIAL OF 
JURISDICTION IN NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY 
The GCM provided guidance on the employee status of student-workers 
in various categories after the Board refused to exercise its jurisdiction to 
decide the question on the merits.122 Having discussed the substance of the 
GCM, this Article returns to the curious justification for the GCM. The 
General Counsel spent a significant portion of the memorandum explaining 
why he could act when the Board declined to do so.  
A. The GCM Policy Rebuttal 
The Board refused to assert jurisdiction in Northwestern University 
because a decision would not “promote stability in labor relations.”123 It is 
worth reiterating that the reason for that conclusion was that the decision 
would be applicable only to a single private school in D-1 FBS football, 
Northwestern University, in an industry in which the vast majority of the 
teams are public institutions.124 The Board reasoned that the NCAA has such 
a controlling influence over individual teams that a decision involving a single 
school relationship with a single institution is an inadequate basis for labor 
guidance in the college sports industry.125  
The General Counsel issued the GCM one year and four months after the 
Board’s rejection in Northwestern University. He also had the benefit of 
the Board’s reversal of fortunes in Columbia University. That case 
returned to the consistent findings and legal principles leading to the 
conclusion that students are statutory employees. Columbia University as 
a precursor to the GCM is not just a matter of timing. The GCM 
intentionally “summarize[d] this recent precedent” in a way that provided 
                                                                                                             
 121. The General Counsel described the common law definition of employee 
as when “any employee” performs duties “for, and under the control of” the 
employer in exchange for compensation. See id. at 10.  
 122. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 123. Nw. Univ. and Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 5 
(Aug. 17, 2015). 
 124. The Board emphasized that there are 125 schools within D-1 FBS football 
and all but 17 are public institutions. Id.  
 125. Id. at 3. 
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consistent and clear authority.126 Accordingly, the GCM cataloged the 
cases in a way that now can provide stability in legal analysis on the student-
as-employee issue.  
The General Counsel, therefore, strategically showed the consistency of 
Board decisions for comprehensive application to all the various circumstances 
of student-employees. The scope of the GCM extends beyond student-athletes 
to include medical interns, student-assistants, non-academic university workers, 
faculty members at religious institutions, and faculty members who may be 
managerial and thus excluded from protections of the NLRA.127 The GCM 
stated that the Office of the General Counsel “will apply” the representational 
decisions in the matter set forth in the GCM.128 The language clearly attempts 
to establish a quasi-mandate uniform action for similar circumstances, which 
promotes stability and consistency within the policy of the NLRA and 
discretionary jurisdiction by the NLRB.129  
B. Changed Circumstances 
In Northwestern University, the Board’s jurisdictional decision had 
several “out-clauses,” or thinly veiled reasons why it may revisit the issue 
and potentially assume jurisdiction in the future.130 The Board’s primary 
point was that changed circumstances could cause the Board to revisit the 
issue.131  
1. Multi-School Context.  
The Board’s denial in Northwestern University carefully delineated 
“out-clauses.”132 It states the following, in relevant part: 
As a final note, the Board’s decision not to assert jurisdiction does 
not preclude a reconsideration of this issue in the future. For 
example, if the circumstances of Northwestern’s players or FBS 
football change such that the underpinnings of our conclusions 
                                                                                                             
 126. MEMORANDUM GC 17-01, supra note 18, at 2.  
 127. Id. at 2–15. 
 128. Id. at 1. 
 129. See The Trustees of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y. and Graduate 
Workers of Columbia-GWC, UAW, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at 20 (2016). 
 130. Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 6. 
 131. Id. (“We note that our decision to decline jurisdiction in this case is based 
on the facts in the record before us, and that subsequent changes in the treatment 
of scholarship players could outweigh the considerations that motivate our 
decision today.”). 
 132. Id. 
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regarding jurisdiction warrant reassessment, the Board may revisit 
its policy in this area.133  
The Board could have been articulating that a critical mass of private 
institutions, not just Northwestern, may have a primarily economic, not 
educational, relationship with their students. Such evidence may be cause 
for the aforementioned reassessment of the issue. 
Indeed, the General Counsel separately observed possible changes that 
could be a basis for action.134 Northwestern University, as originally heard 
by the Board, involved what the Board termed a “single-team case” 
concerning only Northwestern players.135 No other private schools or 
players were involved in the legal action attempting to determine whether 
Northwestern’s student-athletes were employees under the NLRA.136 In 
that instance, the Board stated that “‘it would be difficult to imagine any 
degree of stability in labor relations’ if we were to assert jurisdiction in 
this single-team case.”137 
As the GCM identified, the Board admitted that it avoided the broader 
circumstance of the inclusion of other private schools in the suit.138 The 
Board stated, “‘we are declining jurisdiction only in this case involving the 
football players at Northwestern University; we therefore do not address 
what the Board’s approach might be to a petition for all FBS scholarship 
football players (or at least those at private colleges and universities).’”139 
The Board’s limitation on its ruling allows for multi-school action. 
Indeed, the General Counsel then made clear that his guidance was not just 
for a single group of students at one institution but for all private colleges 
and universities.140 His reasoning was that the common law definition of 
an employee, that is, compensation for services performed under an 
employer’s control, “do[es] not seem to be unique to Northwestern, but 
also appear[s] to be true in the other Division I FBS football private 
colleges and universities.”141  
The GCM, therefore, concluded that “Division 1 FBS scholarship 
football players in private colleges and universities are employees under 
the NLRA” and that such a decision comports with the “statutory language 
                                                                                                             
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. (citing N. Am. Soccer League, 236 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1321 (June 30, 1978)). 
 136. Id. at 5. 
 137. Id. (citing N. Am. Soccer League, 236 N.L.R.B. at 1321–1322). 
 138. MEMORANDUM GC 17-01, supra note 18, at 17.  
 139. Id. (citing Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 6) (emphasis added). 
 140. MEMORANDUM GC 17-01, supra note 18, at 2. 
 141. Id. at 19.  
2017] MEMORANDUM FROM STUDENT-ATHLETES TO SCHOOLS 95 
 
 
 
and policies of the NLRA, and the Board’s interpretation of Boston Medical 
Center and Columbia University.”142 The General Counsel’s reliance on 
Columbia University also was the basis for another part of the rationale for 
action—the distinction between a request for a single bargaining unit and 
unfair labor practices that violate student rights under Section 7 of the Act.  
2. Distinction Between a Single Representation Case and Unfair 
Labor Practices  
The Board provided several reasons to limit its jurisdictional denial in 
Northwestern University, leaving opportunities to refine or opine differently 
in the future. The General Counsel skillfully dissected the Northwestern 
University decision to reveal a distinction between that case, which he did 
not rely upon, and Columbia University, the case on which he placed 
primary reliance.143  
In Northwestern University, the hearing officer framed the issue as 
whether the scholarship players are employees “and therefore entitled to 
choose whether or not to be represented for the purposes of collective 
bargaining.”144 Thus, the only question before the NLRB was whether 
Northwestern University’s scholarship football players could form a 
certified bargaining unit under Section 2(3) of the Act in order to negotiate 
terms and conditions of employment through union representation—a 
“representation” case.145  
The GCM responded to a different question: whether Section 7 of the Act 
prohibits Northwestern from imposing rules that curtail protected speech and 
self-organizing activities of student-athletes.146 If so, the rule would be an 
unfair labor practice under Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.147 The NLRB General 
Counsel clarified that a representation case provides a different remedy than 
                                                                                                             
 142. Id. at 18. 
 143. Id. at 10–14; see also The Trustees of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y. and 
Graduate Workers of Columbia-GWC, UAW, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 23, 2016). 
 144. Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 8.  
 145. MEMORANDUM GC 17-01, supra note 18, at 1. 
 146. Section 7 of the Act expresses the following statement: “Employees shall 
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to 
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage 
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).  
 147. Section 8(a)(1) describes unfair labor practices as including the practice 
of an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of 
the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the NLRA.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). 
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the quest to determine if there is an unfair labor practice, despite the two causes 
of action existing in the same litigation.148  
The GCM distinguished Northwestern University, stating that representation 
cases like Northwestern University “did not directly address the right of the 
workers . . . to seek protection against unfair labor practices.”149 The General 
Counsel then clarified that his GCM concerned only how his office will apply 
recent precedent to unfair labor practices for various categories of workers.150 
One of the categories was scholarship student-athletes.151  
One related point by the General Counsel is that a single representation 
case is different from issuing guidance to all private institutions. Stated 
differently, it is one thing to refuse to extend jurisdiction to “bargaining rights” 
in a representation case at a single private school;152 it is quite another matter 
to decide Section 7 rights for all private institutions with scholarship student-
athletes. The General Counsel stated, “it is clear that nothing in Northwestern 
precludes the finding that Northwestern (or other private college/university) 
scholarship football players are employees under the Act and enjoy the 
protection of Section 7.”153 The General Counsel then provided an example 
of when Section 7 protects a student-athlete who voices his grievances against 
the school:  
[A single representation case for bargaining rights] does not answer 
the question of whether, for example, a football player who has been 
kicked off the team and lost his scholarship because he discussed 
improving concussion protocols with his teammates in violation of 
an unlawful team rule would be entitled to the protections of the 
Act.154  
The ability of a scholarship football player at Northwestern to discuss certain 
working condition issues is separate from a bargaining unit determination, 
according to the General Counsel.155 The former is a Section 7 right involving 
what student-athletes in private schools can discuss amongst themselves, 
regardless of whether they actively pursue a bargaining right and union 
representation.156  
                                                                                                             
 148. MEMORANDUM GC 17-01, supra note 18, at 1. 
 149. Id.  
 150. Id.  
 151. Id. at 16. 
 152. Id. at 17.  
 153. Id. (emphasis added). 
 154. Id. at 17 n.111.  
 155. See supra notes 146–148 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra notes 146–148 and accompanying text. 
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That difference is a fine distinction to the uninitiated, but underlying 
the point is something basic—that United States law should not leave gaps 
as to which citizens can know and understand their legal rights. The 
General Counsel emphasized this notion by stating that “[s]ince the issue 
was raised but left unresolved in Northwestern, it is important that these 
individuals know whether the Act’s protection extends to them, i.e. whether 
if they engage in concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, such activity 
is protected by the NLRA.”157 
The importance of providing student-athletes with clarification of their 
rights leads to the discussion of the implications of Section 7 rights. Can 
student-athletes have protections against their school’s rules preventing their 
discussion of certain issues?  
3. Erosion of NCAA Dominance 
The Board in Northwestern University refused to use its discretion to 
exercise jurisdiction when the matter before them involved a single private 
school case in an industry dominated by the NCAA and public institutions.158 
The Board admitted it could reopen the matter upon a showing of changed 
circumstances, which easily could include the NCAA’s changed relationship 
with its member institutions.159  
Evidence shows that D-1 schools now have greater autonomy to structure 
their football programs and “negotiate” the amount of compensation, services, 
and benefits with players.160 The NCAA’s D-1 Board of Directors granted 
increased autonomy for Power Five conferences.161 The Big Ten, which 
includes Northwestern, is one of the Power Five conferences.162 Now, those 
conferences essentially will write their own rules on important items, such as 
the cost of attendance for scholarships, staff size, recruiting rules, and 
insurance benefits.163 Additionally, in March 2016, the NCAA Board of 
Governors approved a one-time, $200 million distribution to its member 
                                                                                                             
 157. MEMORANDUM GC 17-01, supra note 18, at 1 (emphasis added). 
 158. Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 5–6. 
 159. Id. at 6. 
 160. See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Board Adopts New Division I Structure, NAT’L 
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N (Aug. 7, 2014, 11:49 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about 
/resources/media-center/news/board-adopts-new-division-i-structure [https://perma.cc 
/SU6C-PW6T]. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Football Standings, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www 
.ncaa.com/standings/football/fbs (last updated Oct. 22, 2017, 3:05 AM) [https: 
//perma.cc/A4PP-UQFL]. 
 163. See Hosick, supra note 160. 
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institutions for academic support, life skills, and career enhancements for 
their student-athletes.164 Saliently, the disbursements are at the school’s 
discretion.165  
The underlying source for these changes likely is the Ninth Circuit’s 
opinion in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association.166 The 
O’Bannon plaintiffs asserted that antitrust law prohibits agreements 
between the NCAA and other entities to limit scholarships to a certain sum 
and to fix a price of the name, image, and likeness (“NIL”) of players at zero 
dollars.167  
Largely, the Court agreed. O’Bannon clearly stated, albeit in dicta, that 
schools now may offer individual student-athletes more “compensation” 
than previously prescribed by the NCAA.168 The additional institutional 
flexibility to increase compensation occurred because the Court held that 
the prior NCAA rule that limited scholarships to $5,000 was an antitrust 
law violation and, thus, invalid.169 In the court’s words, “we have little 
doubt that plaintiffs will continue to challenge the arbitrary limit imposed 
by the district court until they have captured the full value of their NIL.”170 
The Court clearly forecasted that flexible arrangements between schools 
and student-athletes are on the horizon. 
In reaction to the inevitability of increased class action litigation from 
former and current student-athletes, the NCAA expanded opportunities for 
the five wealthiest football conferences to provide compensation to their 
scholarship student-athletes.171 Importantly, the Ninth Circuit stated that 
                                                                                                             
 164. See Special One-Time Division I Distribution Q&A, NAT’L COLLEGIATE 
ATHLETIC ASS’N (Feb. 20, 2017), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/finances 
/special-one-time-division-i-distribution-qa?division=d1 [https://perma.cc/2KQ 
Y-FH5Q]. 
 165. Id. 
 166. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 167. Id. at 1076. NIL refers to the players’ rights to prohibit others from using 
their name, image, and likeness. See id. at 1078. This “zero valuation” of NIL 
could be a rallying point for future student-athletes, which easily could lead to 
self-organizing activities and social media use for advocacy purposes. As recently 
noted, “It defies common sense to conclude that the names, images, and likenesses 
of nationally admired athletes have zero value when that NIL helps generate 
billions of dollars to the college sports market, the NCAA, and the schools for 
which the players perform.” Groves, supra note 14, at 112.  
 168. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1074–76. 
 169. Id. at 1078. 
 170. Id. at 1079.  
 171. See Jake New, Autonomy Arrives at the NCAA, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 
19, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/01/19/power-five-leagues-
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antitrust law protects the right of individual schools to establish a trust fund 
for scholarship players, which is disbursable when eligibility expires, as long 
as the institution tethers the disbursement to educational purposes.172  
This change undercuts the Board’s rationale in Northwestern University. 
The Board stated that a single entity private school case within an industry 
dominated by the NCAA does not advance stability in labor relations.173 A 
major part of the Board’s rationale was that the NCAA requires the school 
and athletes to operate within the NCAA’s “constraints,” including, but not 
limited to, the following “dictates”: (1) the maximum number of grant-in-
aid scholarships; (2) caps on the number of players in preseason practices; 
(3) the minimum academic requirements for eligibility; (4) minimum grade 
point averages; and (5) limit on mandatory practices.174 
Arguably, the more the NCAA relaxes its regulatory hold on D-1 FBS 
schools, the weaker the Board’s original rationale. Instead of a three-
headed regulatory environment—the NCAA, the conferences, and the 
schools—against students, greater autonomy by the schools increases a 
two-party relationship of school versus students. In other words, the 
school-student relationship likely will be akin more to other employer-
employee relationships over which the NLRB typically uses its discretion 
to retain jurisdiction.  
Northwestern University reinforces the idea that the Board confined 
its review to “scholarship players at this single institution,” which did not 
promote labor relations stability.175 But it quickly added that “recent 
changes, as well as calls for additional reforms, suggest that the situation 
of scholarship players may well change in the near future.”176  
The Board’s decision to reject jurisdiction in Northwestern University 
was on August 17, 2015.177 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in O’Bannon was 
on September 30, 2016.178 O’Bannon arguably was one of the most highly 
publicized cases in the history of sports law.179 The Board likely was aware 
                                                                                                             
expand-athletic-scholarships-cover-full-cost-attendence [https://perma.cc/SET8-K 
RRF]. 
 172. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1076. 
 173. Nw. Univ. and Collegiate Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, 
at 3 (Aug. 17, 2015). 
 174. Id. at 2.  
 175. Id. at 6. 
 176. Id. at 7. 
 177. Id. at 1.  
 178. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d 1049. 
 179. See, e.g., Cindy Boren, College athletes can unionize. What happens next?, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-
lead/wp/2014/03/27/college-athletes-can-unionize-what-happens-next/?utm_term= 
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of the legal premises of O’Bannon at the time it decided its case, and the 
author would be willing to bet his scholarship, if he had one, that O’Bannon 
was the change referenced in Northwestern University.  
4. Analogous Legal Principles from Antitrust Law 
The NCAA reforms contemplated in Northwestern University find an 
analogous battleground of legal principles in another part of O’Bannon.180 
The firestorm at the bottom is the same educational exemption versus the 
economic relationship test discussed in Columbia University.181 In O’Bannon, 
the NCAA lost its argument that educational institutions essentially are 
exempt from antitrust law.182 The argument is remarkably similar to 
Northwestern’s argument that the educational relationship exempts it from 
labor law.  
Instead, both the Ninth Circuit and the NLRB determined in their 
respective cases that the institutions were engaged in “commercial activity” 
in interstate commerce.183 Commerce was defined broadly in O’Bannon as 
including “almost every activity from which the actor anticipates economic 
gain . . . [including] the transaction in which an athletic recruit exchanges 
his labor and NIL rights for a scholarship.”184 
Despite denying jurisdiction, the Board admitted that Northwestern’s 
rules regarding its student-athletes have a substantial effect on commerce.185 
The Board apparently realized that an educational exemption likely would 
not exist as applied to scholarship student-athletes, even though the legal 
premises are rooted in employment law rather than antitrust law. 
Not all economic-based theories, however, favor the athletes. There is 
another battleground for student-athletes’ rights versus the NCAA and 
                                                                                                             
.57c0ec8279ef [https://perma.cc/C9SH-JUCZ]; George Leef, The NLRB Cannot 
Stop Northwestern’s Football Players From Unionizing, FORBES (Aug. 21, 2015, 
3:15 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeleef/2015/08/21/the-nlrb-cannot-
stop-northwesterns-football-players-from-unionizing/#755a3dfc3e90 [https://per 
ma.cc/7EPJ-MCHM]; Joe Nocera, O’Bannon Ruling Stands, but N.C.A.A.’s 
Status Quo May Yet Collapse, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2016/10/04/sports/ncaa-obannon-case-ruling-supreme-court.html [https://per 
ma.cc/AE R8-8KMJ]. 
 180. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1049. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 1059. 
 183. Id. at 1064; Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 3 n.5.  
 184. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1064. 
 185. Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 6 n.28. 
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member institutions, beyond the NLRA, NIL rights, and antitrust law.186 
Current and former scholarship athletes on the University of Pennsylvania 
track and field team sued the NCAA, claiming that the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (“FLSA”) has wage-and-hour provisions that require 
student-athletes to be paid at least minimum wage for work they performed 
as “employees.”187 The court rejected that claim, holding that the FLSA 
does not apply to student-athletes.188 
The court applied an “economic reality” test and held that the “revered 
tradition” of amateurism was an “essential part of the economic realities 
of the relationship between the Plaintiffs and Penn.”189 The Court also said 
that the Department of Labor already knew that thousands of students were 
unpaid and chose not to consider them employees.190 In support, the Court 
cited the Department of Labor Field Operations Handbook used by its 
wage and hour division.191 The Handbook states that student participation 
in college sports, inter alia, are “primarily for the benefit of the participants 
as part of the educational opportunities.”192 Clearly, this federal court looked 
beyond the statutory definition of employee to arrive at its decision.  
Congress enacted these various laws for differing purposes, reserving 
wide discretion to the agency with oversight responsibility. As noted in 
Berger, the FLSA defines “employee” broadly as “any individual employed 
by an employer.”193 Yet, the Court did not use the same employee definition 
and test used by the NLRB in interpreting the NLRA. 
Both Berger and the issues in this Article involve concerted activity by 
student-athletes. The distinction is that the student-athlete remedy in Berger 
was to receive a minimum wage.194 This Article contemplates the student-
athletes who seek a different remedy—the right to organize themselves 
without unreasonable restrictions from their school. Section 7 of the Act 
specifically governs the latter rights. 
                                                                                                             
 186. Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 162 F. Supp. 3d 845 (S.D. Ind. 
2016). 
 187. Id. at 847, 850; see also Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 3, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 203(e)(1) (2012). 
 188. Berger, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 857. 
 189. Id. at 856. 
 190. Id.  
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 850. 
 194. Id. at 847. 
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IV. WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM A STUDENT HANDBOOK: 
SECTION 7 RIGHTS FOR STUDENT-ATHLETES  
In Northwestern University, the Board admitted that changed 
circumstances could cause a reexamination of the jurisdictional issue in 
cases involving student-athletes. An NLRB Regional Director found that 
opportunity through Northwestern’s Student Handbook. He issued an 
Advice Memorandum in 2016 that focused on the Handbook sections that 
regulate student-athlete conduct, including, but not limited to, their use of 
social media and interactions with media and the public.195 
Section 7 of the Act determines the legality of rules and policies 
regulating certain activities of employees or those who claim the status of 
an employee.196 Section 7 states that “[e]mployees shall have the right to 
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage 
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection . . . .”197 
Extending Section 7 rights to student-athletes is uncharted territory. In 
that sense, it is fortuitous that the Board actually has provided interpretative 
guidance through two documents. The GCM provides comprehensive guidance 
on the state of labor law as applied to a broad range of working students. The 
Regional Director’s Advice Memorandum more narrowly focused on 
scholarship student-athletes. These documents in tandem operate as precedent 
for future matters involving the employee status of the students.198  
In his Advice Memorandum, the Regional Director first distinguished 
his matter from Northwestern University on the same basis as the General 
Counsel provided in his GCM.199 This Regional Director already was 
familiar with Northwestern University because he was the hearing officer 
                                                                                                             
 195. See Advice Memorandum, supra note 31. 
 196. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 197. Id.  
 198. The Advice Memorandum was dispersed prior to the GCM. The GCM 
was discussed first because it provides the state of NLRB precedent and a 
framework to analyze future cases whereas the Advice Memorandum issues 
conclusions without the infusion of case law and is scant on analysis. The GCM, 
therefore, is vital to understanding how and why the Regional Director reached 
certain conclusions in the Advice Memorandum despite the lack of explicit 
rationale.  
 199. See Advice Memorandum, supra note 31; MEMORANDUM GC 17-01, 
supra note 18, at 16–21. 
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in that case.200 As noted above, Northwestern University was a 
representation case under Section 2(3) of the Act.201 The student request 
in Northwestern University was for a certified bargaining unit for a 
representative election.202 The Advice Memorandum concerns unfair labor 
practices under Section 7 and Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.203  
The specific issue for the student-athletes was whether certain rules in 
the Northwestern Football Handbook (“Handbook”) were “unlawfully 
broad” and violated the players’ right to engage in activities protected by 
Section 7 and Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.204 The Regional Director found 
each of the Handbook provisions unlawful in the Advice Memorandum.205  
The Regional Director chose to copy large sections of the Handbook 
verbatim into his memorandum and opined on whether any parts of the total 
section unlawfully prohibited protected activity under Section 7.206 To 
contextualize the Director’s analysis, this Article generally replicates the 
format used by the Regional Director and then analyzes the Director’s 
opinion. For additional reader clarity, the language the Regional Director 
found unlawful appears italicized in this Article. This Article notes why the 
Regional Director found fault with the provisions. Northwestern’s 
corrections are in bold. In almost all instances, the Regional Director 
agreed with Northwestern’s bolded corrections. Those corrections also 
provide insight for other schools and are part of this Article’s analysis. 
A. Social Media Policy 
The first Handbook section scrutinized by the Regional Director was 
the social media policy. The Regional Director focused the most attention 
on this section of the Handbook. NLRB case law corroborates and fills in 
the gaps of the Regional Director’s rationale regarding this policy. 
Particular attention was devoted to the recent lead case of Durham School 
Services, L.P.207 In Durham, the Board held that an employer’s Handbook 
contained unlawful restrictions on social networking under Section 7.208 
                                                                                                             
 200. Advice Memorandum, supra note 31. Mr. Kearney also decided the 
original finding that the scholarship student-athletes at Northwestern were 
employees for bargaining unit purposes. Id.  
 201. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
 202. Advice Memorandum, supra note 31, at 1. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id.  
 205. Id.  
 206. Id. at 2–5. 
 207. Durham Sch. Services, L.P. et al., 360 N.L.R.B. 694 (Apr. 25, 2014).  
 208. Id. at 704. 
104 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
 
 
 
After citing and applying various tests, the Board repeatedly used the same 
phrase as used by the Regional Director—that the offending policy “could 
reasonably be construed” as prohibiting or restricting “Section 7 activity.”209 
The Regional Director depicted Northwestern’s corrected language in bold. 
The Regional Director agreed with Northwestern that all of the bold sections 
cured the unlawful sections. The social media policy in Northwestern’s 
Handbook stated, in relevant part: 
[W]e are concerned about . . . protecting the image and reputation of 
Northwestern University and its Department of Athletics . . . Publicly 
posted information on social networking websites can be seen may 
be regularly monitored by any person with a smart phone or 
internet access, including individuals a number of sources within 
Northwestern University (e.g. Athletics Department, Student Affairs, 
University Police) . . .  
Northwestern student-athletes should be very careful when using 
online social networking sites and keep in mind that sanctions may 
be imposed if these sites are used improperly or depict inappropriate, 
embarrassing, harassing, unlawful or dangerous behaviors such as 
full or partial nudity (of yourself or another), sex, racial or sexual 
epithets, underage drinking, drugs, weapons or firearms, hazing, 
[or] harassment . . . .210 
The Handbook also contained sections designed to provide instructional 
detail and examples to assist students in how to apply the above social media 
policy: 
Do not post any information, photos or other items online that 
contain full or partial nudity . . . or unlawful activity could 
embarrass you, your family, your team, the Athletics Department 
or Northwestern University. . . . Examples of inappropriate or 
offensive behaviors posted on social networking sites may include 
. . . . [p]hotos meant to harass, bully or demean the individuals 
included in the photo by offensive reference to their race, sex, 
disability, age, national origin, religion or any other status 
protected by law or Northwestern University policy.211 
The Regional Director examined the above provisions for potential 
violations of Section 7 of the NLRA.212 The Regional Director provided 
                                                                                                             
 209. Id.  
 210. Advice Memorandum, supra note 31, at 2.  
 211. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
 212. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).  
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only the conclusion that the social media policy “would reasonably be 
construed as prohibiting Section 7 activity.”213 There was no rationale 
revealing which parts of the policy violated particular sections of Section 
7.214 The conclusory language is well-established verbiage because it 
tracks bedrock NLRB caselaw.215  
The Advice Memorandum found several sections of the social media 
policy unlawful.216 The primary offenders were words that were ambiguously 
overbroad and chilled activity protected by Section 7 of the Act.217  
1. “Inappropriate” and “Embarrassing”—Overbroad Language 
with a Chilling Effect on Protected Section 7 Activity  
The social media policy states that online posts depicting “inappropriate, 
embarrassing . . . behaviors” may warrant sanctions against the student-
athlete.218 Section 7 does not protect only the right of employees to form, join, 
or assist labor organizations and choose their collective bargaining 
representatives but also allows employees “to engage in other concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection . . . .”219  
Concerted activity for mutual aid or protection beyond collective 
bargaining logically includes the ability to communicate through written 
word, oral speech, or any other means to protect a wide range of joint self-
help activities, even if the goal is not to form or participate in a union.220 
For labor law purposes, protected speech falls under Section 7.221 
Therefore, if an employer’s policy prohibits employees from talking about 
common grievances against the employer or meeting to strategize about how 
to help each other, the policy violates Section 7.  
As applied, Northwestern is the employer of student-athlete employees. 
The school Handbook, therefore, cannot prohibit the protected activity of 
                                                                                                             
 213. Advice Memorandum, supra note 31, at 2.  
 214. The only other language in the Advice Memorandum under the social 
media policy was the additional conclusion that the Northwestern amendments 
that the Regional Director placed in bold did correct the unlawful language and, 
thus, “the corrected language is lawful as written.” Id. at 3.  
 215. See Durham Sch. Services, L.P. et al., 360 N.L.R.B. 694 (Apr. 25, 2014), 
for the summarized line of cases. Durham is discussed more fully in Part IV.B.I.  
 216. Advice Memorandum, supra note 31, at 2–5. 
 217. Id. at 5. 
 218. Advice Memorandum, supra note 31, at 2. 
 219. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
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posting online communications designed for mutual aid and protection. 
Assume a scholarship student-athlete posted a video on Facebook showing 
a coach’s verbal tirade or other physically or mentally abusive behaviors. 
Using social media to expose that behavior could embarrass the coach and the 
university. A school policy that prohibits “inappropriate” or “embarrassing” 
communications or activities by its student-athletes, however, violates Section 
7. The same result flows where players receive punishment for creating a 
players-only meeting outside of practice so they can discuss ways to get 
extra water breaks during intensive practices on brutally hot days. The 
Northwestern Handbook language is therefore overbroad because it captures 
such communication and actions that otherwise are protected activity under 
Section 7. The Durham line of cases corroborate that analysis.  
2. “Family” and “Team” Protection—Inadequate Purpose 
Northwestern used a broad definition of embarrassment in its draft of 
student-athlete prohibitions. The policy originally did not prohibit just 
inappropriate and embarrassing content; it also protected the school from 
student-athlete posts that may “embarrass you, your family, [or] your team 
. . . .”222 Student-athletes could not complain about onerous or abusive 
changes to their eating and living arrangements, class schedules, and 
practices—all of which would be protected Section 7 activity.223  
Northwestern struck the clause and the Regional Director called that 
clause unlawful.224 The reasonable inference is that such language has a 
chilling effect on social media communications that may embarrass the 
team. The Durham line of cases also support that conclusion.225 
B. Corroboration from NLRB Case Law 
The NLRB has faced similar circumstances concerning overbroad 
provisions. In Durham, the Board found the employer-school’s social 
networking policy unlawful in several respects, including the determination 
that some provisions were overbroad.226  
                                                                                                             
 222. See Advice Memorandum, supra note 31, at 2. 
 223. Id. at 3.  
 224. Id. at 2–3. 
 225. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 226. Durham Sch. Services, L.P. et al., 360 N.L.R.B. 694, 704 (2014). 
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1. Appropriate Tests for Section 7 Determinations 
In Durham, the Board provided one of the most concise summaries of 
the applicable standard to decide Section 7 controversies. Without drawing 
too fine a point on overlapping substance, the tests determine three things. 
First, the tests determine whether the employer’s rule or policy would 
“reasonably tend to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 
rights,” even without actual enforcement of the provisions.227 The tests next 
determine whether the employer’s rule or policy expressly restricts Section 7 
activity, or if not, whether employees “would reasonably construe the 
language to prohibit Section 7 activity.”228 Lastly, the tests determine whether 
the employer’s rule or policy “could reasonably be construed as coercive,” 
even if other reasonable constructions exist.229  
The Board then noted an important rule of construction for ambiguous 
provisions. The Board stated that “[e]ven if a rule is ambiguous, any ambiguity 
in a work rule that may restrict protected concerted conduct ‘must be 
construed against the [employer] as the promulgator of the rule.’”230 
The NLRB and the Court, therefore, should examine Handbook 
provisions not only for overt prohibitions on Section 7 activity but also the 
inferences of a chilling effect and ambiguity. 
2. Application of the Multi-Test Standard 
Durham involved an employer who provided school transportation 
services and an employee bus driver, Helen Cheesman, who claimed that 
her employer terminated her because of the employer’s attempt to 
“disenfranchise her from voting in the representation election.”231 
Cheesman’s union filed several objections to the election with the NLRB 
and a complaint alleging that the employer engaged in various unfair labor 
practices.232  
                                                                                                             
 227. Id. (citing Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998)).  
 228. Id. The Board noted that this two-pronged explicit or implicit inquiry was 
a refinement of the chilling test. When applying the test, the Board also will examine 
whether the rule was created to prohibit Section 7 activity or actually applied to 
restrict such activity by employees. Id. (citing Lutheran Heritage Vill.-Livonia, 343 
N.L.R.B. 646, 646 (2004)).  
 229. Id. at 704–05 (citing Double D Constr. Grp., 339 N.L.R.B. 303, 304 
(2003)).  
 230. Id. at 705 (citing Ark Las Vegas Restaurant, 343 N.L.R.B. 1281, 1282 
(2004)).  
 231. Id. at 701.  
 232. Id. at 698.  
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Among the alleged unfair labor practices was a claim that the employer’s 
Handbook Addendum contained an unlawful “Social Networking Policy.”233 
The policy stated that “[i]t is also recommended that the employees . . . limit 
contact with parents or school officials, and keep all contact appropriate. 
Inappropriate communication with students, parents, or school representatives 
will be grounds for immediate dismissal.”234 
The Board then focused on two other sections of the policy. The first bore 
the subheading, “Interaction with Co-workers,” and stated, in relevant part, 
that “communication with coworkers should be kept professional and 
respectful, even outside of work hours.”235 The other scrutinized provision 
was titled, “Expectations of Privacy.”236 The language stated, in relevant 
part, that “[e]mployees who publicly share unfavorable written, audio or 
video information related to the company or any of its employees or 
customers should not have any expectation of privacy, and may be subject 
to investigation and possible discipline.”237 
The Durham Board first applied the chilling test and incorporated the 
overbroad principle. In stating that the social networking policy reasonably 
would tend to chill employees in the exercise of Section 7 rights, the Board 
reasoned that “[w]hile the policy does not explicitly restrict Section 7 
protected activity, it contains no limiting language whatsoever, and is so 
overbroad that it could reasonably be construed as extending to Section 7 
activity.”238 
In Durham, the Board focused on the employer’s privacy provisions. 
It applied the NRLB’s rule for the construction of ambiguous terms.239 The 
Board highlighted the employer’s troubling terms that advised employees 
“to . . . keep all contact appropriate . . . professional and respectful” and 
warned employees that sharing “unfavorable information” could bring an 
investigation and disciplinary action by the employer.240  
The Board clearly stated the error in that language under Section 7: 
“[W]ithout indicating what the Employer considers appropriate or 
inappropriate conduct, or what is considered professional and respectful, 
or what constitutes unfavorable information is, in my view, unreasonably 
broad and vague.”241 The Board concluded that employees reasonably could 
                                                                                                             
 233. Id. at 704.  
 234. Id.  
 235. Id.  
 236. Id.  
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id.  
 241. Id. 
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interpret this language as restraining their Section 7 right to “communicate 
freely with fellow employees and others regarding work issues and for their 
mutual aid and protection.”242 The Board specifically noted that ambiguity 
is to be construed against the employer.243  
The ambiguity rule in Durham likely also was a part of the reasoning 
of the Regional Director in the Advice Memorandum. The Regional 
Director concluded that if the terms “inappropriate” and “embarrassing” 
remained in the policy, they “would reasonably be construed as prohibiting 
Section 7 activity.”244 Although he provided no rationale, “inappropriate” and 
“embarrassing” are as ambiguous and vague as the terms found in Durham. 
Accordingly, the rationale is equally applicable to both circumstances. All 
other private colleges and universities with similarly toxic terms in their social 
media policies for student-athletes likely would receive an unfavorable 
decision from the NLRB.  
Similarly, the Northwestern social media policy provides no limitation or 
definition for its terms “inappropriate” and “embarrassing.” Northwestern 
deleted both terms in its revised version.245 The language would have been 
unlawful if these terms remained, according to the Regional Director.246  
Lastly, the Durham Board applied the rule preventing coercion.247 
Both the coercion and ambiguity rules evidence a deeply rooted policy to 
encourage self-organizing activities by employees rooted in the NLRA and 
the Board decisions. In Durham, the Board purposefully admitted that there 
was no evidence of specific instances of disciplinary action against 
employees.248 Nonetheless, a policy still can be unlawful. The Board 
concluded that the “mere maintenance” of the policy provisions would have 
a “reasonable tendency to . . . coerce the pro-union campaign tendencies 
activities of employees . . . .”249 
In the Advice Memorandum regarding Northwestern’s Handbook, the 
protected activity was not voting in an election like Durham. It is not 
difficult, however, to imagine student-athletes having an election among 
                                                                                                             
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Advice Memorandum, supra note 31, at 2. 
 245. See id. at 2–5. 
 246. For context, the relevant clause in the Northwestern Handbook under “Social 
Media Policy” stated “Northwestern student-athletes should . . . keep in mind that 
sanctions may be imposed if these sites are used improperly or depict inappropriate, 
embarrassing . . . or dangerous behaviors.” See Advice Memorandum, supra note 31, 
at 2 (emphasis added). 
 247. Durham, 360 N.L.R.B. at 703. 
 248. Id. at 705. 
 249. Id. 
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themselves to elect a representative spokesperson to discuss grievances 
with coaches or the administration. In fact, the Northwestern University 
representation case, as decided by the administrative law judge, would 
have authorized a union vote by scholarship student-athletes.250 Several 
other scenarios apart from representation cases could have violated the 
Northwestern policy. Student-athletes would be just as protected using 
Facebook, Instagram, or Twitter to advocate arranging their class schedules 
in a way efficient for study or for particular courses of interest within their 
majors without loss of playing time or other adverse consequences.  
If Northwestern or some other private school in higher education has a 
social media policy with similarly ambiguous, vague, or overbroad language, 
the NLRB should find such language an unlawful restriction on protected 
Section 7 activity. The finding would be the same even if the school did not 
impose disciplinary actions against the student-athletes. Even if the 
ambiguity is benign, the above standards favor giving the student-athlete 
the benefit of the doubt. It is also noteworthy that the same fate also would 
inure to those schools that applied such a policy to medical interns and 
graduate student-workers per the NLRB rulings in Boston Medical Center 
and Columbia University.251 
3. Narrowly Tailored Curative Provisions  
The Regional Director approved of Northwestern’s replacement 
language.252 Instead of prohibiting “inappropriate” and “embarrassing” 
behavior by a student-athlete, the cure prohibits only behavior that had no 
reasonable connection to the lawful forming or joining of a bargaining unit 
or mutual benefit. Authorized prohibitions include those that “contain full 
or partial nudity (of yourself or another), sex, racial or sexual epithets, 
underage drinking, drugs, weapons or firearms, hazing, harassment or 
unlawful activity . . . .”253  
Certainly, a Facebook post that boasts of sexual indiscretions or 
displays firearms is not part of a mutual protection of student-athletes in 
their working environment. Such activity, therefore, is not protected. Even 
                                                                                                             
 250. The administrative law judge in fact said, “I direct an immediate election 
in this case.” Nw. Univ. and Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, 
at 19 (Aug. 17, 2015). The election did not occur due to an appeal and full Board 
refusal to exercise jurisdiction over the case. Id. 
 251. Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999); The Trustees of Columbia 
Univ. in the City of N.Y. and Graduate Workers of Columbia-GWC, UAW, 364 
N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 23, 2016). 
 252. See Advice Memorandum, supra note 31, at 5. 
 253. Id. at 2. 
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hazing, which finds its way into the football culture, is not for the mutual 
aid and protection of student-athletes. This conclusion is evident from the 
Regional Director’s approval of Northwestern’s amended language that 
prohibited online communications that depict hazing.254 
4. Inadequacy of Image and Reputation Rationale 
The application of Section 7 to Northwestern’s social media policy is 
particularly interesting when analyzing a seemingly innocent preamble. 
Northwestern’s original social media policy stated, “We are concerned 
about . . . protecting the image and reputation of Northwestern University 
and its Department of Athletics.”255 This language had legal consequence 
beyond its literal terms.  
Initially, the language appears benign. Yet, Northwestern deleted the phrase 
without replacement, and the Regional Director accepted the deletion.256 A 
reasonable inference is that Northwestern realized that protecting the image and 
reputation of the school is so broad that it could prohibit social media posts 
regarding the formation or joining of student-athlete groups for their mutual 
benefit—protected Section 7 activity.257 Counsel for the university likely sought 
to avoid an unfavorable ruling from the NLRB and chose to eliminate the 
potential conflict between the school’s reputational interest and the 
student-athletes’ interests in bargaining jointly. Eliminating the reference 
to the school’s image and reputation removes even the appearance of 
impropriety or conflicting interests.  
A hypothetical shows how easily the issue could arise. Assume a 
student-athlete posts an image on Instagram showing a coach grabbing 
him by the shoulder pads while screaming, “Get your ass in gear,” or other 
colorful words to that effect. The post likely would impugn the image or 
reputation of the school. If the player’s language in his post to his fellow 
athletes encourages a collective protest against verbal or hands-on abuses 
by coaches, the posting activity likely would be protected under Section 7. 
The Regional Director, therefore, likely will opine that a school’s image 
and reputation is an inadequate reason to prohibit otherwise protected 
social media posts. 
                                                                                                             
 254. See id. at 5. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 2, 5. 
 257. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
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5. Inadequacy of Monitoring Functions  
Northwestern’s Handbook originally stated that social media websites 
“may be regularly monitored” by “a number of sources” within the 
university, including, but not limited to, the Athletics Department, Student 
Affairs, and University Police.258 The referenced types of activities were 
overbroad in that the policy prohibited social media posts that could 
include concerted activity for the mutual benefit or protection of the 
athletes. Northwestern’s curative language stated that “publicly posted” 
websites “can be seen”—rather than “monitored”—by “any person with a 
smart phone or internet access, including individuals within Northwestern 
University.”259  
Similar to the removal of image and reputation as a basis for prohibitions, 
Northwestern determined that it was wiser to avoid any appearance that the 
policy was putting the university’s interests ahead of the student-athletes’ 
interests. The advantage to the university is not obvious in the original policy 
language. A careful review of the original policy, however, reveals an 
ambiguity. Nothing in the original language restricts university access to 
only those communications posted to the public. By failing to limit the 
university’s access to the student-athletes, the policy allows Northwestern 
to gain access to private posts.  
The curative language states that the university only has access to 
“publicly posted” websites.260 Prior to that amendment, the policy did not 
preclude the university from accessing private posts in which the student-
athlete adjusted the privacy setting to restrict access to the post to only friends 
or, more to the point, fellow scholarship student-athletes.  
Colleges and universities have a legitimate interest in proactively finding 
a hornet’s nest before anyone gets stung, including the school. Preventive 
action generally is a good policy, but if the school uses that principle to enact 
a rule requiring that student-athletes share all private posts with the 
“Athletics Department, Student Affairs, [and] University Police”261—as 
was stated in Northwestern’s original policy—the NRLB may find that 
rule to be a chilling and unlawful policy. A real possibility exists that this 
issue could ripen into a contested matter. The Regional Director found that 
                                                                                                             
 258. Advice Memorandum, supra note 31, at 2. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id.  
 261. Id. at 2. 
2017] MEMORANDUM FROM STUDENT-ATHLETES TO SCHOOLS 113 
 
 
 
Northwestern’s rules required a coach to have access to social media 
accounts of the scholarship football players.262  
Northwestern, presumably with advice from its attorneys, decided to 
give the university the same rights of access to student-athletes’ websites 
as any other member of the general public.263 That access would remove 
any inference that the school attempted extraordinary access to thwart or 
prohibit otherwise protected speech. Inferentially, the reason for a 
university’s access to private posts may be to prevent dissemination of 
information between student-athletes in a private group. It does not take much 
imagination to envision campus police or a member of the coaching staff 
monitoring social media sites of student-athletes to see if the student-athletes 
posted messages or images that the university might consider “inappropriate or 
“embarrassing” or damaging to the “image” or “reputation” of the university.  
At first blush, it seems that the university should be able to impose 
“sanctions” as deterrents to prevent these student-athletes, some of whom are 
teenagers, from bad behavior or bad judgment. The well-purposed sanction 
simply may be to require immediate removal of the posts. Immediate removal 
would prevent dissemination to others, including NCAA investigators or 
labor unions looking for a new collective bargaining unit. As Durham made 
clear, however, reasonable purposes do not exempt the employer if the rules 
also have chilling effects on protected Section 7 activity. 
Thus, although Northwestern’s original social media policy appears to 
protect its legitimate interest in the school’s image and reputation, 
Northwestern nonetheless chose to delete the reference. This deletion of 
the reference occurred to prevent the following consequences: (1) any 
inference that the university was prioritizing its own interests over the 
organizational interests of its student-athletes; and (2) any potential 
chilling effect the university’s interests may have on the student-athletes’ 
rights to protected Section 7 activity. Private institutions in higher 
education with scholarship student-athletes should reexamine their 
Handbooks for similar clauses and pursue similar curative actions.  
6. Safe Haven Provisions Prohibiting Illegal Activity 
Northwestern, or any of the other 16 private D-1 schools, faces the 
question of whether the existing Handbook provisions may be unlawful 
under Section 7. University counsel or another responsible source at 
                                                                                                             
 262. Northwestern’s polices restricted players’ rights to post on the internet or 
speak to the media. Nw. Univ. and Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. 
No. 167, at 9 (Aug. 17, 2015). 
 263. Northwestern removed language in its policy that limited players’ 
communications with the press. See Advice Memorandum, supra note 31, at 3.  
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Northwestern was wise to be proactive in creating solutions rather than 
litigating against the NLRB.  
It also was wise that the university took advantage of an obvious safe 
haven. That safe haven simply allows prohibitions on that which is illegal. 
Northwestern deleted overbroad language like “inappropriate” and 
“embarrassing” and replaced it with the umbrella term “unlawful . . . 
behaviors.”264 The amended policy contains the following examples 
within that umbrella: (1) underage drinking; (2) drugs—presumably non-
prescription; (3) weapons or firearms—presumably unlicensed; and (4) 
references offensive to those with a “status protected by law.”265 The 
common sense logic is that the NLRA does not protect illegal activity, 
even if the employees’ illegal activities are an attempt to create or band 
together for bargaining or mutual aid and protection.  
C. The Sports Medicine and Player Communications Rule: The Link 
Between Injury Complaints and Section 7 Activity 
Scholarship football players in D-1, the highest level of the collegiate 
game, inevitably face the prospect of injuries. Yet, of course, not every 
injured player who broadcasts an injury is engaged in protected Section 7 
activity.266 The potential for protected activity to be associated with 
athletic injuries, however, is palpable. For example, former players have 
filed lawsuits mutually against the NCAA and their respective member 
institutions regarding concussions.267 The plaintiffs requested certification 
as a class action suit.268 Requesting class action certification alone 
represents an attempt to complain and seek redress for the mutual aid of 
similarly situated former student-athletes.269 The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in O’Bannon allowed current NCAA scholarship student-athletes 
to join the certified class action lawsuit, alleging antitrust violations by the 
                                                                                                             
 264. Id. at 2. 
 265. Id. 
 266. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).  
 267. See supra note 4.  
 268. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Concussion Injury Litig., 314 F.R.D. 580 
(N. Ill. 2016). 
 269. Class action suits can be authorized in federal litigation under Rule 23(a) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the following occur: (1) “joinder of 
all members is impracticable”; (2) common questions of law or fact exist; (3) the 
claims or defenses are typical among the class; and (4) the chosen plaintiff 
representatives “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23(a). 
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NCAA.270 Thus, it is not far-fetched to envision student-athletes 
discussing or mobilizing themselves against the NCAA or member 
institutions in some future controversy.  
The Northwestern litigation and the concussion and antitrust litigation 
all are highly publicized. Most, if not all, student-athletes at the private 
schools likely are aware of mobilizing possibilities regarding health issues 
of all student-athletes through either litigation or labor law. Private school 
student-athletes who join in litigation likely do not have protection under 
Section 7 simply through filings with the court.  
There is potential Section 7 activity while scholarship student-athletes 
at a private college or university communicate with others about injuries 
or safety concerns in an effort to protect themselves while engaging in the 
sport. As Durham articulated, the students have the right to “communicate 
freely with fellow employees and others regarding work issues and for 
their mutual aid and protection.”271 This right includes the statutory right 
to join with others to select their own representatives.272 Consistent with 
the thesis of this Article, such student-athlete communications include 
their use of social media.  
The potential for a university rule violation is more than hypothetical. 
The NLRB clearly stated through its General Counsel that student-athletes 
are employees of private universities and that the institutions are subject 
to Section 7 and potential unfair labor practice claims of scholarship 
student-athletes.273 If these student-athletes choose to communicate with 
other private school student-athletes about concussions or other health 
aspects of the game, that is, their work, no one reasonably can question 
that such communication is for their “mutual aid or protection.”274 If a 
private institution, therefore, enacts a rule or policy that restricts or 
prohibits such communication, the school faces a very real possibility that 
                                                                                                             
 270. The District Court allowed six current players from major D-1 football 
programs to be class action claimants in July 2013. The players were Arizona 
linebacker Jake Fischer and kicker Jake Smith, Vanderbilt linebacker Chase 
Garnham, Clemson cornerback Darius Robinson, Minnesota tight end Moses 
Alipate, and wide receiver Victor Keise. See O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. C 09–
3329 CW, 2009 WL 4899217 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009); see also Tom Farrey, 6 
Current Players Join NCAA Lawsuit, ESPN (July 22, 2013), http://www.espn 
.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/9491249/six-current-football-players-join-ed-obannon- 
ncaa-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/QPX3-DFUD]. 
 271. Durham Sch. Services, L.P. et al., 360 N.L.R.B. 694, 705 (2014).  
 272. See Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 273. See discussion supra Part II. 
 274. The “mutual aid and protection” of employees is part of the activity 
protected by Section 7 of the NLRA. § 157. 
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the NLRB will find that provision unlawful. In fact, the NLRB’s Regional 
Director did just that, relative to Northwestern’s “Sports Medicine [and] 
Player Policy Communication Rule.”275  
The Northwestern provision in question stated the following: 
“Confidential: Never discuss any aspects of the team, the physical condition 
of any players, planned strategies, etc. with anyone. The team is a family and 
what takes place on the field, in meetings or in the locker room stays within 
this family.”276 The NLRB Regional Director found the provision unlawful 
because it “would reasonably be construed to prohibit Section 7 activity, 
including discussions about vital health and safety issues.”277 
Northwestern deleted the offending provision and replaced it with 
language curing the legal infirmity. The new language stated,  
Protected Personal Health Information: Based on privacy considerations 
associated with medical conditions and the need to ensure that teams 
with whom we compete do not obtain medical information about 
our student-athletes, you should not reveal the medical conditions 
or injuries to persons outside the Northwestern University football 
team and staff.278  
The amendment then limited the scope of the prohibition by stating,  
This restriction does not apply to information that is generally 
known and available to the public, nor does it prohibit student 
athletes from discussing general medical issues and concerns with 
third parties provided that such discussions do not identify the 
physical or medical condition or injury of specific or named 
student athletes.279  
Perhaps anticipating controversy in authorizing the new provision, the 
Regional Director explained why his advice comported with Section 7. He 
emphasized that allowing the discussion of general medical issues while 
prohibiting discussions of specific players “struck the proper balance.”280 
That balance, in his words, was between the need to maintain 
confidentiality of the players and team while conversely permitting 
                                                                                                             
 275. Advice Memorandum, supra note 31, at 3. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 4. 
 278. Id. at 3. 
 279. Id. (emphasis added). 
 280. Id. 
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players to “speak out . . . about vital health and safety issues impacting 
themselves, their teammates, and fellow collegiate football players.”281  
The Regional Director was cognizant of federal laws protecting the 
privacy of various health and educational student records and did not want 
to advise schools to jeopardize compliance with those laws in order to 
comply with Section 7 of the NLRA.282 The balance, therefore, is to allow 
privacy-related prohibitions while also allowing communications that 
further self-organizing activities for the mutual benefit of student-athlete 
employees. The Regional Director’s reference to allowing players to 
“speak out” on “health and safety issues impacting themselves, their 
teammates and fellow collegiate football players” easily contemplates the 
use of social media to discuss issues, such as the impact of concussions in 
college football and the dangers of high intensity drills in extreme summer 
conditions.283  
The 16 other private D-1 schools will encounter the same issue if their 
Handbooks contain the same type of medical prohibitions. The law is in 
many ways the art of distinctions. The General Counsel’s office for these 
institutions likely is to become acquainted with Handbook language that 
separates medical prohibitions of specific players versus allowances for 
general health issue discussion among student-athletes and the public.  
Medical grievances have implications and application beyond sports. 
The GCM provided guidance to private schools for medical resident 
interns and graduate student-workers.284 Medical schools have come under 
fire for the extraordinarily long periods that residents are on call.285 A 
Handbook provision preventing the discussion of those conditions is 
arguably just as unlawful under Section 7 as the sports medicine 
prohibitions originally enacted by Northwestern.  
                                                                                                             
 281. Id.  
 282. A primary federal law for such protection is the Family Educational 
Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (“FERPA”). 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2012). FERPA 
protects the privacy of student education records. FERPA applies to all educational 
agencies and institutions that receive funds under any program administered by the 
United States Department of Education. Private schools can admit students who 
receive federal loans to pay for tuition and room and board, so they too can be 
subject to FERPA. See id. 
 283. Advice Memorandum, supra note 31, at 3. 
 284. MEMORANDUM GC 17-01, supra note 18, at 16–17. 
 285. Reportedly, residents “are expected to spend up to 80 hours a week in the 
hospital and endure single shifts that routinely last up to 28 hours.” Ryan Park, Why 
So Many Young Doctors Work Such Awful Hours, ATLANTIC (Feb. 21, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/02/doctors-long-hours-schedules 
/516639/ [https://perma.cc/Z763-C37K]. 
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D. Student-Athlete Rights and Responsibilities—Dispute Resolution 
Procedure 
At the core of an employee’s Section 7 right to communicate “freely” 
with fellow employees and others regarding “work issues” for their 
“mutual aid or protection” is the ability to complain about working 
conditions imposed by the employer and seek redress for the complained-
of conditions through collective action by the employees.286 Therefore, if 
a private employer enacts a handbook policy that prohibits or restricts the 
discussion of a workplace grievance among employees or others, the 
employer and the handbook policy clearly violates Section 7.287  
Northwestern had such a provision in its original student-athlete 
Handbook. The “Dispute Resolution Procedure” stated that any student-
athlete with a complaint or grievance involving his “personal rights and 
relationship to the athletic program” first must discuss the issue with the 
school’s Director of Football Operations.288 If the matter remained 
unresolved, the student-athlete would meet with the Senior Associate Athletic 
Director or the Athletics Director.289 If there still was no resolution of the 
dispute, the student-athlete could appeal to the Faculty Committee on Athletics 
and Recreation and, ultimately, the President of the University.290 
Upon review, the NLRB Regional Director concluded that this prohibition 
“would reasonably be construed as prohibiting Section 7 activity.”291 The only 
reasoning necessary was the simple statement that such a rule unlawfully 
“prohibit[s] discussions with fellow players and their parties concerning 
workplace grievances.”292  
Wisely, Northwestern deleted the provision without an attempt to 
resurrect, ameliorate, or otherwise disguise it. Again, the millennial 
student-athlete is likely to use social media to air grievances about a coach 
deemed overbearing or unfair anywhere on or off campus.293 Images from 
                                                                                                             
 286. Double D Constr. Grp., 339 N.L.R.B. 303, 304 (2003).  
 287. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 288. Advice Memorandum, supra note 31, at 4.  
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
 293. “Millennial student-athlete” refers to those who are born in the 1980s or 
1990s. Millennial, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com 
/dictionary/millennial [https://perma.cc/78RM-VPFC]. For example, a University 
of Central Florida kicker, Donald De La Haye, created a YouTube channel and 
profited from his regular use of that channel. The NCAA ruled that he was 
ineligible to play collegiate D-1 football. He chose to keep his channel and lose 
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mobile devices transferred to Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, or other 
platforms with editorial text should be an anticipated occurrence once 
student-athletes are aware of their Section 7 rights in the private school 
setting. The best practices model of a private school Handbook, therefore, 
likely will follow Northwestern’s lead in deleting such existing provisions.  
E. Athletic Communications—Media Relations 
The NLRB considers student-athletes “employees” who have the right to 
self-organize for their mutual aid and protection under Section 7 of the 
NLRA.294 Those activities include student-athletes’ ability to communicate in 
writing, orally, and through images on social media.295  
Unsurprisingly, when a private university employer restricts or prohibits 
a student-athlete’s access to the media, unlawful restraints potentially exist on 
protected Section 7 activity. Northwestern provides yet another case on point. 
The university Handbook contained an “Athletic Communications for 
Student Athletes Rule.”296 Under the heading “THINGS TO REMEMBER 
DURING AN INTERVIEW,” the rule originally stated, in relevant part: 
You should never agree to an interview unless the interview has been 
arranged by the athletic communications office. All media requests 
for interviews with student athletes must be made through athletic 
communications. If you are contacted directly by the media . . . you 
should politely, but firmly, redirect the reporter to the athletic 
communications office.297 
The Regional Director concluded that this clause reasonably would be 
construed as prohibiting Section 7 activity.298 Although no reasoning 
accompanied the conclusion, the basis likely is that a provision only 
                                                                                                             
his scholarship. Nick Bromberg, UCF kicker says he's no longer on scholarship 
following YouTube decision, YAHOO SPORTS (Aug. 1, 2017, 1:26 PM), 
https://sports.yahoo.com/ucf-kicker-says-hes-no-longer-scholarship-following-you 
tube-decision-18642819.html [https://perma.cc/4XQK-MANH]. 
 294. MEMORANDUM GC 17-01, supra note 18, at 2.  
 295. The statutory term “activity” should have a broad interpretation because 
any ambiguity in an employer’s terms is construed in favor of the employee and 
against the employer-promulgator of the rule. Ark Las Vegas Restaurants, 343 
N.L.R.B. 1281, 1282 (2004). The Advice Memorandum found social media 
prohibitions on discussions or communications within each of the Handbook 
policies. See Advice Memorandum, supra note 31, at 2–5. 
 296. Advice Memorandum, supra note 31, at 4–5.  
 297. Id. at 5. 
 298. Id. 
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authorizing university-arranged interviews is essentially a university veto 
power over all communications with the media initiated by student-
athletes—even communications concerning discussions for the mutual aid 
and protection of the student-athlete and his teammates. The restrictions 
on access violate Section 7 of the Act because Section 7 extends that right 
of communication to “others,” including the media.299 Therefore, if a 
student-athlete at a private school chose to speak to the media directly 
about working conditions, practice times, coach interruptions of classes, 
dangerous practice conditions, or failure to follow concussion protocol, for 
example, Section 7 protects the student-athlete’s right to do so.300 
Northwestern apparently came to the same conclusion because it deleted 
the original provision and replaced it with language that gives the student-
athlete the right to engage in media interviews without interference from the 
school. The new provision simply says, “As responsible student athletes, you 
may directly speak with members of the media if you choose to do so.”301  
The amended language provides the player with an option to refer the 
media to the athletic communications office. A student-athlete, however, should 
not receive any adverse consequences for choosing direct media contact 
because punishing the athlete for non-school sanctioned communications on 
mutual protection issues likely is chilling the activity and coercive. Such 
punishment is contrary to established NLRB precedent.302 
The foregoing limitations on the institutions, however, still allow some 
freedom in handbook drafting. For example, Section 7 of the Act does not 
prohibit a school from promoting its culture and mission. Northwestern’s 
amended media provision encouraged student-athletes to be professional.303 It 
also suggested that players “share credit for your success” by “talking about the 
contributions of your teammates and use their names.”304 The Northwestern 
media provision even articulates an athletic moral code and life lessons. The 
policy provided the following advice: “[t]alking about the great work of others 
shows you have confidence in your own role and the value of your own 
contributions, so you’re not afraid of letting someone else have their moment 
of glory, too.”305 This language is similar to the modern corporation’s 
recitation of its core values.306  
                                                                                                             
 299. Double D Constr. Grp., 339 N.L.R.B. 303, 304 (2003).  
 300. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).  
 301. Advice Memorandum, supra note 31, at 5.  
 302. See Jurys Bos. Hotel, 356 N.L.R.B. 927, 932 (2001).  
 303. See Advice Memorandum, supra note 31, at 5. 
 304. Id.  
 305. Id.  
 306. Facebook, for example, has five core values: (1) Be Bold; (2) Focus on 
Impact; (3) Move Fast; (4) Be Open; and (5) Build Social Value. Facebook 
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Again, law is often the art of distinctions. The curative language states 
that student-athletes “should be aware of and consider” certain elements 
of good character.307 The policy did not phrase the statements as demands. 
The subtle distinction between encouragement and coercion is the 
difference between lawful and unlawful in this context.  
Importantly, Northwestern deleted the next sentence in its policy: 
“Avoid the negatives, as they breed discontent and trouble.”308 The fine 
line is that encouraging an optional “yes” is very different for labor purposes 
from a mandatory “no” on communications affecting the workplace.  
The Regional Director said the original provisions were unlawful and 
accepted the amendments.309 The key was creating the opportunity for 
student-athletes to speak to the media on their own terms. The Regional 
Director said, “[t]he [e]mployer modified the rule to clarify that student 
athletes may choose to speak directly to the media and have ‘the option of 
referring the media . . . to the athletic communications office.’”310 Thus, 
the universities have a legitimate interest in protecting their brands, 
including the ability to minimize damages from any misguided comments 
of student-athletes who have a platform for speaking to millions of people. 
The NLRB now has imposed new constraints on the private institutions 
that seek to regulate those communications.311  
V. SOCIAL PROTESTS AS PROTECTED SECTION 7 ACTIVITY 
The majority of this Article has two primary premises. First, 
scholarship student-athletes at private D-1 schools should have employee 
status. Second, school rules and policies cannot prohibit or interfere with 
the student-athlete’s right to self-organize, including the right “to form, 
join, or assist labor organizations,” choose their own representatives, or 
engage in other concerted activities for their “mutual aid or protection.”312  
For those purposes, “concerted” activities are defined broadly as 
“when two or more employees take action for their mutual aid or 
                                                                                                             
Careers, Facebook’s 5 Core Values, FACEBOOK (Sept. 8, 2015), https://www.face 
book.com/pg/facebookcareers/photos/?tab=album&album_id=16551786114354 
93 [https://perma.cc/DKZ9-87H4]. 
 307. Advice Memorandum, supra note 31, at 5. 
 308. Id.  
 309. Id.  
 310. Id.  
 311. See MEMORANDUM GC 17-01, supra note 18. 
 312. 29 U.S.C. § 157. Section 8(a)(1) describes unfair labor practices as including 
the practice of an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the 
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the NLRA.” Id. § 158 (a)(1) (2012). 
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protection regarding terms and conditions of employment.”313 Concerted 
activity also includes acts by a single employee if he is “acting on the 
authority of other employees, to bring group complaints to the employer’s 
attention, trying to induce group action, or seeking to prepare for group 
action.”314 Concerted activity appears so broad that no loopholes exist as 
long as the activity has a nexus with the workplace.315  
This section includes a third premise involving social protests. 
Circumstances exist in which student-athlete communications and activities 
appear to be social protests but, in fact, have sufficient factual linkage with 
workplace grievances among co-workers to fall within protected Section 7 
activity.  
An example may illuminate the controversy, although hypothetical facts 
have been added to otherwise actual facts. In 2017, Team Israel qualified to 
play in the 16-team World Baseball Classic—a tournament of nationalistic 
baseball teams.316 The team struggled to qualify in recent years, challenged to 
find sufficient talent among Jews willing to play for the team.317 In fact, only 
one player on the roster is a native-born Israeli.318 To show Jewish pride in 
the sport, Team Israel players collectively took off their baseball hats and 
put on yarmulkes during the playing of their national anthem.319 The 
activity was a rallying cry to attract other Jewish players, a plea for more 
players to become nationalistic and represent Israel.320 A protest regarding 
a country’s failures, as is occurring in the United States, is only one side 
of the same coin that asks players to be more nationalistic. Both acts are 
symbolic expressions.  
Several American colleges and universities have foreign-born athletes 
who are subject to the student-athlete rules. International events can 
influence those student-athletes. They also can use the sports platform to 
                                                                                                             
 313. See Employee Rights, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., https://www.nlrb 
.gov/rights-we-protect/employee-rights (last visited July 30, 2017) [https://per 
ma.cc/5P7E-NFM5].  
 314. Id.  
 315. Concerted activity is a statutory term within the protected activity of 
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. § 157. See Chamber of Commerce 
of U.S. v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60, 66 (2008); NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 
465 U.S. 822, 829–37 (1984); Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 563–68 (1978) 
(discussing the term “concerted activity”).  
 316. Ken Belson, Team Israel Scours the Game to Find Jewish Ballplayers, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2017, at B8.  
 317. Id.  
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. at B12. 
 320. See id.  
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mobilize teammates and recruit others to join a cause. The only facts that 
are required to link the social cause with labor law protection are a 
workplace-related cause and an interrelated activity among coworkers.  
Adding a few hypothetical facts can bring the issue squarely within 
the scope of this Article. D-1 college basketball and soccer teams travel 
internationally during the offseason.321 Assume that one team has two or 
more players from a primarily Muslim country and that those players 
choose to wear a patch in support of the Muslim faith in light of anti-
Muslim hate speech occurring during matches and on campus. Assume the 
players then post the images on social media. Imagine that the school, 
fearing backlash and a decline in applications, enacts a handbook 
provision banning all expressions of nationalism among student-athletes. 
If the players assert that they are employees, consistent with NLRB 
direction, they may claim that their expressions and related discussions are 
protected activity under Section 7 and that the handbook prohibition is an 
unfair labor practice under Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.322 The institution 
may counter that the Act only contemplates workplace self-organizing 
activity, and the social media post is an expression of support for a foreign 
country, unrelated to playing soccer for a college in the United States.  
The issue may ripen to whether the “activity” of posting images on 
social media is a concerted activity for mutual aid and protection or, 
conversely, whether playing a sport for a university is an activity that is 
insufficiently linked to workplace activities. No clear NLRB authority 
exists on that issue. Yet, applying the above authorities appears to give the 
student-athletes an edge. That edge exists because two or more players 
demonstrate concerted activity.323 Their activity was for their mutual 
protection because they were responding to anti-Muslim sentiments on 
campus and in games. A hearing officer, based on NLRB precedent, likely 
would view the activity as self-organizing in the workplace.324 The 
prohibition would be an unfair labor practice because it would prohibit 
protected activity under Section 7 of the Act.  
                                                                                                             
 321. For example, the Michigan State University basketball team traveled to 
Rome, Florence, Maranello, Verona, Trieste, and Venice, playing in three-day 
tournaments, including games against senior men’s teams from Italy and Russia. 
See Michigan St. to Face International Teams on Italy Trip, ESPN (Apr. 23, 2015), 
http://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/12750835/michigan-state 
-spartans-schedule-men-basketball-trip-italy [https://perma.cc/85LD-85XD].  
 322. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157–158 (2012). 
 323. See § 157. 
 324. See the NLRB decisions interpreting Section 7 of the NLRA discussed 
supra Part II.C.1. of this article 
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Yet another change in facts favors the schools. The hat-switching 
players on Team Israel probably knew about the national anthem protest 
of NFL quarterback Colin Kaepernick. Kaepernick knelt during the 
national anthem to protest the treatment of black men by police forces 
within the United States.325 The publicity, scrutiny, and acrimony 
associated with that singular act inflamed passions on both sides of the 
issue and inspired players in other sports to act.326 Now assume 
Kaepernick is a scholarship player at Northwestern instead and kneeling 
was simply a singular protest. Assume too that the collegiate Kaepernick 
had someone use his iPhone to create a video of his act and that Kaepernick 
then shared the video on Instagram with the general public. There was no 
accompanying plea to his teammates to join him. If the school had a policy 
that prevented purely individual protest expressions through social media, 
the NLRB likely would consider the rule lawful because there was no 
organizing activity under Section 7 of the Act.327  
Thus, beyond the more obvious workplace issues of direct grievances 
involving the sport during play and practice times, that is, the workplace, 
the companion issue is whether scholarship student-athletes who engage 
                                                                                                             
 325. In April 2017, Time Magazine voted Kaepernick among the 100 Most 
Influential People. See Jim Harbaugh, The 100 Most Influential People: Colin 
Kaepernick, TIME, http://time.com/collection/2017-time-100/4736257/colin-kae 
pernick/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9KCR-Q39F].  
 326. Kaepernick’s kneel during the national anthem was replicated by Major 
League Baseball players, including Oakland A's catcher Bruce Maxwell. Dayn 
Perry, A’s catcher Bruce Maxwell becomes first MLB player to kneel for national 
anthem, CBS SPORTS (Sept. 24, 2017), https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/as-
catcher-bruce-maxwell-becomes-first-mlb-player-to-kneel-for-national-anthem/ 
[https://perma.cc/YL6F-SSDY]. An entire starting lineup and coaching staff for 
a soccer team, Bundesliga club Hertha Berlin, kneeled during the German anthem 
prior to a match against Schalke to protest perceived intolerance in Berlin. Daniel 
Rapaport, Hertha Berlin Players Kneel During German Anthem , SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.si.com/soccer/2017/10/14/hertha-
berlin-kneel-german-national-anthem-protest [https://perma.cc/BP7R-9P4U]. The 
issue became a major theme with each NFL game during the early portion of the 
2017–2018 season to the point that NFL owners and the union representing the 
current players are scheduled to seek common ground at an upcoming owners 
meeting. Cindy Boren, As NFL owners wrestle with national anthem demonstrations, 
protests continue Sunday, WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2017), https://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2017/10/15/as-nfl-owners-wrestle-with-national- 
anthem-demonstrations-what-will-sundays-games-bring/?utm_term=.e907f2e208f7 
[https://perma.cc/B6V9-NSFK]. 
 327. See §157. 
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in social activism have the same Section 7 protections. The issue is far 
from mere semantics.  
Further, the state of North Carolina lost the opportunity to host certain 
NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament games because of a so-called “bathroom 
bill” that the LGBTQ and transgender community alleged was unlawfully 
discriminatory.328 Assume scholarship football or basketball student-athletes at 
a private school hold a self-initiated press conference and announce upcoming 
boycotts of previously scheduled games in the state of North Carolina. The 
teams also announce through social media that there are openly gay 
members of the team that received vile threats and harassment on their 
campus. They develop headbands for their uniforms with the name of their 
proposed organization that supports the LGBTQ community.  
If their school had a social media policy that prohibited unapproved 
symbols, self-initiated media interviews, or the use of social media for 
social activism, the policy likely is invalid. The NLRB rationale, like in 
Northwestern University, would be that players reasonably would view the 
policy as interfering with their concerted attempts to band together for 
their mutual aid and protection under Section 7 of the Act.329 At the very 
least, the NLRB may follow Durham and conclude that the policy would 
chill the team’s self-organizing efforts.330 Even if the policy required prior 
approval rather than an outright ban, the provision could be unlawfully 
coercive under the Durham jurisprudence.331  
Another example highlights the importance of factual distinctions. 
Wisconsin basketball player Bronson Koenig took part in Native-American 
protests against an oil pipeline running through cherished property of Native-
American tribes.332 Hypothetically, assume there is disputed evidence on 
                                                                                                             
 328. The North Carolina Legislature passed House Bill 2 requiring use of public 
bathrooms based on a person’s gender on his birth certificate. See H.B. 2, Gen. 
Assemb., 2d Extra Sess. (N.C. 2016), http://www.ncleg.net/sessions/2015e2 
/bills/house/pdf/h2v4.pdf (Mar. 23, 2016) [https://perma.cc/MKK8-4RED]. The 
legislature then repealed the law after the NCAA and other business entities moved 
events outside the state. See Jason Hanna, Madison Park & Eliott C. McLaughlin, 
North Carolina repeals ‘bathroom bill’, CNN (Mar. 30, 2017), http://www.cnn 
.com/2017/03/30/politics/north-carolina-hb2-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/H5QK- 
CYEN]. 
 329. See Advice Memorandum, supra note 31, at 2–5. 
 330. See Durham Sch. Services, L.P. et al., 360 N.L.R.B. 694, 704–05 (Apr. 
25, 2014). 
 331. See id. 
 332. Andy Katz, Wisconsin’s Bronson Koenig: ‘I want to join the fight’ against 
oil pipeline, ESPN (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball 
/story/_/id/17555998/wisconsin-guard-bronson-koenig-protest-dakota-access-pipe  
line-fellow-native-americans-weekend [https://perma.cc/8N42-CCGX].  
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whether Koenig actively sought participation from his teammates. Also 
disputed is whether Koenig personally asked the athletic director to change 
the venue of any games scheduled in states with approved pipelines.  
Wisconsin is a publicly supported university.333 Therefore, Section 7 does 
not apply.334 What if Koenig was a scholarship athlete at a private D-1 
institution, and the institution had a rule that prohibited “any attempt of 
student-athletes to influence or interfere with venues selected by the 
university, the NCAA or the conference”? If the evidence established that 
Koenig’s social media posts sought to organize players and that there was 
a sufficient nexus to mutual workplace issues, Koenig could prevail on his 
claim that the policy was unlawful under Section 7 and was an unfair labor 
practice under Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.  
Koenig could lose, however, depending on a careful delineation of the 
facts. Assume again that Koenig was playing at a D-1 private school. If 
the evidence established that he was making a singular protest, without 
attempting to involve teammates, the policy prohibiting these actions 
could be lawful. If, on the other hand, the evidence established that Koenig 
sought to organize teammates, there is a deeper question: do the reasons 
for the protest have a sufficient nexus with working conditions, that is, the 
regimen of playing and practicing the sport for the school? If the activity 
is to help Native-American tribes affected by the pipeline—with no 
reasonable correlation to playing basketball for the school—there should 
be no unfair labor practice or unlawful prohibition of protected Section 7 
activity.335 The question for the decision-maker is whether teammates 
joining to protest oil pipelines are showing support for the tribes, outside 
of the intended workplace environment under the Act. There is no 
precedent directly on point for such budding issues, so the school likely 
possesses the stronger argument. 
The overlap between the labor organizational activity and social 
activism is closer than it appears. As a general proposition, a call for 
change can be, and often is, for the benefit of those who self-identify with 
a common grievance. Mobilizing a group to change workplace conditions 
conceivably could include the environment in which those players live on 
campus. That cause could be akin to the collective action of the University 
                                                                                                             
 333. See Campuses, UNIV. OF WIS. SYS., https://www.wisconsin.edu/campuses/ 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2017) [https://perma.cc/35MK-HHTG]. 
 334. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012) (excluding the state or federal governments 
or any subdivision thereof from the statutory definition of employer under the 
NLRA). 
 335. See discussion supra Part I.B. (noting the public-private divide in NLRB 
jurisdiction).  
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of Missouri football team that threatened to boycott future games if the 
administration failed to address racial issues on campus.336  
The link between social activism and the campus environment also 
could arise from a scenario like the threatened boycott by the University 
of Minnesota football team.337 The team members claimed that when the 
administration suspended ten of their teammates, the university violated 
the teammates’ due process rights.338 If those same scholarship student-
athletes chose to meet to form a union to represent themselves against the 
university in future issues of discipline and the school was a private 
institution, any rule prohibiting those activities presumably would be 
unlawful.339 If the school had a handbook rule or policy prohibiting the use 
of social media to assert the group claims, the same rule also is likely to 
interfere with protected Section 7 activity. 
VI. MODELING BEST PRACTICES  
Although this Article focuses on burgeoning rights of student-athletes, 
this section puts the author in the position of counsel for the private 
institution and tasked with drafting provisions that manage the relationship 
between the school and its student-athletes. Obviously, the challenge is to 
avoid the legal pitfalls Northwestern experienced. Other private schools 
undoubtedly will review their policies to conform to the recent NLRB 
proclamations or seek legislative or judicial means to avoid NLRB 
jurisdiction. Below are some conceptual considerations that may aid that 
cause. 
                                                                                                             
 336. The black football players at the University of Missouri particularly upped 
the ante after a week of the boycott by pledging a refusal to play unless the university 
president resigned. See Marc Tracy & Ashley Southall, Black Football Players Lend 
Heft to Protests at Missouri, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2015/11/09/us/missouri-football-players-boycott-in-protest-of-university-president  
.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/RYW4-AV9J]. If Missouri were a private school, its 
school policies restricting or prohibiting communications or activities that could 
damage the school’s brand easily could have been before the NLRB, much like the 
Northwestern Handbook policies for student-athletes.  
 337. See At Minnesota, a football boycott is over but tensions are not, CHI. 
TRIBUNE (Dec. 27, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/college/ct-
minnesota-football-boycott-tensions-20161227-story.html [https://perma.cc/5A 
UH-3YMJ]. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Meetings to form a union clearly are protected activity under Section 7 of 
the National Labor Relations Act. See § 157.  
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A. The Horrors of Ambiguity 
The jurisprudence following Durham and the Advice Memorandum 
regarding Northwestern provide the current baseline for a best practices model 
in drafting employer policies and rules governing student-athletes. One lesson 
from the foregoing discussion is that drafters should define relevant terms 
carefully. More to the point, the definitions should leave no doubt that any 
prohibitions fall clearly outside protected Section 7 activity. In Durham, the 
Board found that terms like “inappropriate,” “professional,” “respectful,” and 
“unfavorable” were vague and overbroad.340 In the Advice Memorandum, the 
terms “inappropriate” and “embarrassing” also were deemed to be unlawful.341  
Although it is easy to avoid those particular terms, no bright-line test exists 
for the various other circumstances discussed above. The most recent 
pronouncement specific to a private university was the Advice Memorandum, 
which did not provide a rationale linking unlawful policies to a particular legal 
authority.342 Therefore, rule drafters only have inferences, and more 
satisfyingly, the general guidance from the GCM. The broad language of 
Section 7 also leaves substantial room for interpretation. The right “to form, 
join, or assist labor organizations,” “collectively bargain,” or engage in “other 
concerted activities” for “mutual aid or protection” can include a range of 
activities not yet tested before the NLRB or the courts.343  
There are, however, some clear guideposts. The players’ self-
organizing activity must possess a nexus with the workplace.344 A social 
media post regarding an illegal act like the student-athlete brandishing 
unlicensed firearms is not protected activity under Section 7.  
The question then becomes whether some activities, technically not 
illegal under existing statutes, still can be prohibited without interfering 
with a student-athlete’s protected rights. Conceivably, a social media post 
can depict actions that are related to organizing for mutual benefit with 
teammates but also viewed by the school as “hazing” or “harassing” 
outside of existing statutes. Defining the prohibited actions is critical. As 
with many other code-based prohibitions, a party can win or lose based on 
whether he falls within the defined prohibition.  
                                                                                                             
 340. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2. regarding the Section 7 standard for 
vague and overbroad provisions in Durham. 
 341. See discussion supra Part IV.A. regarding the social media policy 
provisions found to be unlawful.  
 342. See Advice Memorandum, supra note 31. 
 343. See § 157. 
 344. The nexus requirement is evident from statutory definitions, including the 
definition of an “employee,” which is defined as a person who “works” for another 
in return for compensation. See MEMORANDUM GC 17-01, supra note 18, at 12.  
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For example, ambiguity exists in even the revised Northwestern social 
media policy. The policy prohibits the use of social networking sites that 
depict “hazing” or “harassment.”345 No clear or immediate definition 
exists for those terms. Neither term says, “This prohibition applies to 
hazing or harassment as defined by law.” Later, the social media policy 
includes in the penumbra of violations the following language: “or any 
content that violates Northwestern University, Athletics Department or 
student-athlete codes of conduct and/or state or federal laws.”346 
Are “hazing” and “harassment” prohibited only if the activity violates 
existing state or federal law? Or is there a broader or narrower definition in a 
university code of conduct that applies to the prohibition? If the drafters made 
clear that its prohibitions only cover violations of federal, state, or local law, 
the definition is clear, and under the Advice Memorandum, the policy is 
within the safe harbor and lawful.  
Obviously, an attorney for the student-athlete would seek to use the most 
narrowly defined terms. Narrowly defined terms could generate the argument 
that the policy did not apply to the student-athlete because his activity fell 
outside of the defined prohibition, and, consequently, the court should reverse 
any adverse sanction, such as suspension or a loss of scholarship, for example, 
imposed against the student-athlete.  
Yet, innumerable scenarios that may occur off the field or court do not 
have interpretive guidance from an NLRB publication or case. An important 
attribute for drafters, therefore, is having the imagination to envision the 
potential issues before they arise and draft provisions that solve the problem 
in advance.  
B. Mixed Messages and Potential for Predominant Use Tests 
Less technical, but just as relevant, is the following question: is the 
“activity” part of a continuum of actions or part of an overall activity that 
is unprotected and severable from protected activity? For example, 
disruptive forces within the music industry provide opportunities for 
student-athlete mobilization through Section 7 protected activity.347 At the 
time of drafting this Article, Spotify was the leading music streaming 
service of its kind, with 50 million paying customers and another 50 
million who listened without cost.348 Investors have valued Spotify at more 
                                                                                                             
 345. See Advice Memorandum, supra note 31, at 2. 
 346.  See id. 
 347. § 157.  
 348. Ben Sisario, Licensing Accord Eases Spotify’s Path to Going Public, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2017, at B3. 
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than $8 billion.349 Spotify has entered into a licensing agreement with the 
world’s largest record company, Universal Music Group, enhancing the 
potential profitability for Spotify’s artists.350 Can a school prohibit scholarship 
basketball or football players from teaming up with some of Spotify’s top 
music artists like Drake, U2, the Weeknd, and Lady Gaga to create songs 
imploring student-athletes to demand a share of NCAA revenues?  
The more precise issue arises under the following scenario: assume 
the school has incorporated by reference the NCAA rule prohibiting a 
player from profiting from his own NIL.351 Assume the above Spotify 
venture is legal. The university rule seemingly would prohibit the activity 
under the Regional Director's Advice Memorandum.352  
Yet, a challenge by New Age Athletes353 may be approaching, 
especially because the NLRB has not faced the following issue: can a 
titular NCAA rule engrafted into a private school's social media policy neuter 
activities otherwise protected under Section 7? There is no direct precedent 
on this issue.  
Nor should the future importance of the intersection of entertainment and 
sports be underestimated when considering social media policies for student-
athletes. Continuing the music streaming hypothetical is instructive. There can 
be “mixed use” activities. As the New Age Athlete grows in the audacity of 
business acumen, social media will be a useful tool. Music streaming has 
untapped potential for reaching and mobilizing student-athletes. “Streaming 
now makes up a majority of the revenue for record labels,” according to 
Lucian Grainge, CEO of Universal—the world’s largest record company.354 
Schools can do nothing to prevent student-athletes from creating, hearing, or 
sharing such streamed content, including clever lyrics that advocate self-
organizing activities. The NLRA protects those efforts.355 Private colleges 
and universities, therefore, must draft social media policies carefully to 
avoid provisions that fall within unwittingly broad NCAA prohibitions.  
                                                                                                             
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. 
 351. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, NCAA 2017-2018 DIVISION I 
MANUAL, Bylaw 12.5.2.1 (effective Aug. 1, 2017). 
 352. See Advice Memorandum, supra note 31. 
 353. The author created the term “New Age Athletes” to describe players with 
growing business acumen and those who participate in evolving social entrepreneurship 
ventures. See Roger Groves, New Age Athletes as Social Entrepreneurs: Proposing a 
Philanthropic Paradigm Shift and Creative Use of Limited Liability Company Joint 
Ventures, 11 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 213 (2011).  
 354. Sisario, supra note 348. 
 355. Section 7 of the NLRA protects self-organizing activities of employees. 
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).  
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To date, only Northwestern University speaks to the precise terms for 
student-athlete polices. Other private schools face the issue, and factual 
circumstances may vary from those found in Northwestern University. The 
NLRB may, therefore, look to precedent in other areas of law in the 
absence of precedent in current labor law. An example already exists for 
student-athletes. Groundbreaking litigation addresses whether student-
athletes have sufficient rights to their own name, image, and likeness 
(“NIL”) to trump First Amendment rights of entities like the NCAA and 
private contractors who use their NIL without permission.356 In Keller v. 
Electronic Arts, Inc. and Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., federal courts adopted 
a transformative use test, balancing whether the user of the NIL has 
“transformed” the work beyond a virtual mirror image of the student-
athlete’s NIL.357 Such a test attempts to balance a set of facts to see if the 
work fits into one legal category over another.358  
The issues of this Article are related. Keller and Hart involved 
“work[s]” using players’ NIL.359 This Article includes players who use 
their NIL in social media for self-organizing activity. Faced with a provision 
prohibiting a student-athlete from using his own NIL with Spotify records, the 
NLRB may consider a predominant use or transformative use test. 
The test should examine whether the majority of the content protects 
organizing activity rather than protecting other purposes like entertainment, 
which is unrelated to the mobilization of other students. The essential inquiry 
is two-fold. The first level is to determine whether the totality of the activity 
falls within a protected category. The second level examines whether there 
are transformational facts—facts that may pull activities that seem outside of 
protected activity into Section 7 protection. One example may be a transition 
from purely individual entertainment, such as creating a tweet about his 
own concussions, to a message that also tells players to mobilize for a 
cause, such as a Facebook post emphasizing the collective right to demand 
stronger protocols in treating concussions. Just as facts can transform an 
NIL work from a right-of-publicity protection to one that is protected 
under the NIL-user’s First Amendment rights, there may be facts that 
transform individualized unprotected activity—a student-athlete’s own 
                                                                                                             
 356. See Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 2010 WL 530108 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010), 
aff’d sub. nom. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 
724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d. 141 (3d Cir. 2013).  
 357. See Keller, 2010 WL 530108, at *4; Hart, 717 F.3d at 163–65.  
 358. Under Keller, a transformative video game (‘work”) depicting the NIL of a 
student-athlete survives the student-athlete’s claim that his right of publicity 
precludes entities from using his NIL without the student-athlete’s permission. See 
In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d at 1284. 
 359. See id.; Hart, 717 F.3d at 163–65.  
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concussion—to protected Section 7 activity. The transformation would 
exist if additional facts reveal that the concussion discussion mobilizes 
other players for the cause of stronger protocols for treating concussions.   
C. Severability  
Another option for the NLRB and courts is to avoid the all-or-nothing 
approach of a transformative use test. Under that test, if most of the activity 
is lawful, then all of the activity is lawful even if other actions are subject 
to exclusion under a school’s policy.360 The unlawful portion is incidental 
to the majority, lawful portion.361 For example, consider the scenario in 
which a player uses Instagram solely to show off his new touchdown dance 
the day before the game, anticipating the opportunity to use it on the field. 
Here, there is no link to mobilizing players for mutual aid or protection. 
Add the additional fact that other parts of his Instagram post ask players 
to boycott future games unless the school removes the mold from the 
locker rooms. The latter could be protected activity under Section 7.362 The 
NLRB or court may authorize polices that sever the dance and retain the 
policies that allow the grievance.  
If such a severability standard were employed, the NLRB and courts 
would face an allocation issue. Again, the evidence would be primary in 
determining where to draw the line between protected organizing activity 
and unlawful activity that a social media policy legally can sanction.  
The above discussion highlights the difficulties private colleges and 
universities are likely to face in the future when updating their social 
media policies for student-athletes. The same issue will exist for the other 
student-workers.  
D. Media Freedom for Student-Athletes 
One of the unlawful Northwestern policies was the school’s attempt 
to regulate and redirect media interviews of student-athletes.363 The 
broader implication is that all other private D-1 programs with scholarship 
student-athletes are in the same position as Northwestern for NLRB 
scrutiny and Handbook revisions. Drafters of a media policy should 
contemplate the likelihood that the “media” can include social media in all 
                                                                                                             
 360. See, e.g., Hart, 717 F.3d at 161–71 (discussing and applying the transformative 
use test). 
 361. See id. 
 362. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 363. See discussion of “Athletic Communications for Student Athletes Rule” 
supra Part IV.E.; see also Advice Memorandum, supra note 31, at 5. 
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forms and platforms. Because social media is largely unregulated, student-
athletes may receive interview requests from anyone with a smart phone, 
anyone mature or immature, any adult or minor, or anyone in bedrooms or 
bars.  
Consider the consequences of a student-athlete who, on the one hand, 
boasts about receiving funds that violate NCAA rules but, on the other 
hand, expresses trepidation about losing his eligibility. He may have those 
discussions with other players or with someone who does not feel bound 
by journalistic ethics. Also consider the well-intentioned efforts of a 
school to promulgate rules designed to suppress or prohibit student joint 
discussions about NCAA errors or abuses by coaches or administrators. 
School rules that inhibit such activities appear clearly unlawful because, 
to borrow from standard NLRB decisions, “it would be reasonably 
construed to prohibit Section 7 activity.”364 Importantly, it must be a 
reasonable view only from the player’s objective viewpoint—not the 
viewpoint of the school that promulgated the rule.  
Imagine the conundrum created if a private school had the NCAA 
established penalties for an escort service and prostitution ring for basketball 
players at the University of Louisville.365  
Under NLRB caselaw and provisions of the NLRA, current scholarship 
athletes playing prominent roles on the team would be able to speak directly 
to the media without a university filter and without university veto power.366 
The existence of disputed facts in highly charged circumstances does not alter 
the protection. Because Section 7 protections extend to student-athlete 
communications with others beyond their teammates, ethics-free social media 
bloggers or the NCAA could interview current students without permission. 
Of course, some non-journalists could be students, overzealous fans, or 
individuals who have violated a school policy. Such individuals could 
implicate the student-athletes. These “interviews” could be at late-night 
venues that are breeding grounds for adversity for the student-athlete and the 
school.  
Certainly, the NCAA and the private schools with scholarship athletes 
have various rules designed to provide orderly administration of athletics, 
with protections for the welfare of the athletes and reputational interests 
                                                                                                             
 364. The boilerplate language used by the NLRB to describe Nothwestern’s 
Handbook provisions was that the rule “would reasonably be construed as 
prohibiting Section 7 activity.” See Advice Memorandum, supra note 31, at 5. 
 365. See Tracy, supra note 1.  
 366. MEMORANDUM GC 17-01, supra note 18; Durham Sch. Services, L.P. et 
al., 360 N.L.R.B. 694 (2014). 
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of the institution.367 The GCM and the Advice Memorandum, however, 
require that those institutions carefully parse which rules interfere with 
Section 7 protected activity. Handbook drafting historically has not had to 
include those considerations. For private D-1 institutions, the need now 
exists for drafting clarity in light of Section 7.  
The heightened ability of student-athletes to discuss programmatic 
issues freely does just that—heightens awareness of the programmatic 
issues and the potential NCAA violations. The public, armed with social 
media exposure, could become an even earlier and more dominant court 
of public opinion. The potential adverse impact could be varied and 
significant, including, but not limited to, losses and opportunity costs in 
the following contexts: (1) the image and reputation of the school; (2) the 
careers of the coaches and staff; and (3) the financial fortunes of the 
school.368  
This new confluence of NLRB proclamations could adversely affect 
all of the above. The root cause of those maladies is not necessarily the 
broadcasting of those circumstances. If the allegations are true, the 
problem is rooted in the errors and violations themselves. Therefore, 
private institutions have increased the pressure to avoid errors and 
violations because the potential for public exposure of transgressions is 
greater and is disseminated from a high profile source: star athletes.  
E. Policy Considerations and Institutional Strategies to Overcome Them 
Institutions that enact regulations for student-athletes now must 
consider that the relationship between management and the workforce is 
                                                                                                             
 367. The D-1 NCAA Manual commences with overriding principles, including 
the language:  
It is the responsibility of each member institution to conduct its athletics 
programs and manage its staff members, representatives and student-
athletes in a manner that promotes the ideals of higher education and the 
integrity of intercollegiate athletics. Member institutions are committed 
to encouraging behavior that advances the interests of the Association, 
its membership and the Collegiate Model of athletics.  
(emphasis added). 2017–2018 DIVISION I MANUAL supra note 351, at xii; see also 
YASSER ET AL., supra note 2, at 2–5 (summarizing NCAA structure, responsibilities, 
and rules in its Division 1 Manual, Section 2.5).  
 368. The adverse impact referenced above is contrasted with the fact that 
football and basketball success historically has increased student applications, 
student selectivity, royalty income, donor contributions, non-revenue sports 
subsidization, and facility upgrades. See generally William Berry, Enhancing 
“Education”: Rebalancing the Relationship Between Athletes and the University, 78 
LA. LAW REV. 197 (2017). 
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not a legally level playing field. The NLRA policy promotes self-
organizing activity by employees,369 which is why overbroad or 
ambiguous provisions affecting employee rights are construed against the 
employer.370 That is why provisions that are not direct prohibitions but 
only tend to chill self-organizing activities are still unlawful.371 Even rules 
or policies that could have another reasonable construction still can be 
unlawful.372  
The private institution’s model for drafting, therefore, must focus 
diligently on scrubbing handbook provisions of any semblance of an 
unlawful motive, that is, an intent to chill or prohibit self-organizing 
expressions or activity for the mutual protection or aid of scholarship 
student-athletes.373 Durham, however, also illustrates that even language 
that is benign on its face potentially can be a pretext for interfering with 
protected activity.374  
Despite the numerous favorable factors for student-athletes, private 
institutions do have pathways to sustainable rules without violating the 
Act’s policies or violating Section 7 of the Act. Assume that student-
athletes seek a representation election to select or retain a union. Assume 
too that the school has rules that restrain or prohibit that activity. The 
institution has the viable defense that it would have imposed the same 
action even in the absence of the protected conduct.375 Private institutions 
should have best practices for drafting student-athlete rules that 
contemplate whether disciplinary actions flow from the rule based on 
circumstances wholly apart from self-organizing activities of its student-
athletes. 
The well-drafted handbook for private institutions with scholarship 
athletes should start with a big picture view of what the NLRB now requires 
of those institutions. In a far more serious context, the congressional autopsy 
after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 concluded that part of what 
                                                                                                             
 369. Section 7 of the Act protects employee efforts to form or join labor 
organizations or other concerted activity for mutual aid or protection. 29 U.S.C. § 
157 (2012).  
 370. Durham, 360 N.L.R.B. at 705. 
 371. Id. at 704. 
 372. Id.  
 373. Id. 
 374. In Durham, the Board found that the employer’s claim that the 
employee’s termination was from a failed driver recertification was a pretext for 
retaliating against her voting in a representation election and her union activities 
related thereto. Id. at 701.  
 375. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1087 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 
899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).  
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allowed the tragedy to happen was the United States’ defense 
infrastructure’s “failure[ of] imagination” to envision what could go 
wrong.376  
As minor as handbook rules may seem, Section 7 protections allow 
for the publicizing of potentially sordid and highly damaging allegations. 
In light of the guidance from the memoranda of the General Counsel and 
Regional Director, rule drafters must engage in a balancing act. They must 
navigate labor caselaw to protect the university and student privacy while 
also protecting the student-athlete discussion of grievances and self-
organizing activities for their mutual aid and protection. The school must 
permit the activities even if student-athletes are responding to alleged 
abuses or improprieties by the institution that could cause NCAA 
sanctions.  
F. Analytical Construct for Drafting Provisions: Incorporating 
Competing Interests from Multiple Legal Subject Areas 
In light of the myriad potential adverse consequences for the 
institutions, this Article suggests an analytical construct containing two 
objectives: (1) imagine future issues that the school has yet to confront in 
this new legal context; and (2) build the exact language of the provisions 
based on a sequence of inquiries. The result should be a handbook that 
withstands NLRB scrutiny.  
Below is a spreadsheet with columns for each stage of the drafting 
process. Necessarily, the first step envisions the types of adverse 
circumstances that give rise to the rule or policy. The process starts with 
imagining all student-athlete actions sought to be regulated by the institution, 
regardless of whether the actions are protected Section 7 activity. In a separate 
column, those facts are analyzed with the appropriate NRLB test and 
governing law to record which activities are protected by Section 7. Only 
after the facts are analyzed under the applicable law would the drafters 
create the actual language of the rule or policy. Next, the drafters should 
remember that finding the language unlawful often is the punishment 
imposed under the rule.377 Therefore, a separate column allows the drafter 
to scrutinize each potential disciplinary action, sanction, or adverse 
consequence. The spreadsheet should remind the drafters to examine not 
only direct sanctions but also clauses that the NLRB may deem 
                                                                                                             
 376. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report 
_Ch11.pdf (last updated Aug. 21, 2004) [https://perma.cc/QSP4-LM6H]. 
 377. See, e.g., Advice Memorandum, supra note 31. 
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ambiguous, coercive, or chilling on protected activities of the student-
athletes.  
As a double check on the legality of such provisions, the final 
spreadsheet column is for potential adverse consequences. It follows a pro-
con analysis. The purpose is to determine if the risks are greater than the 
rewards and whether the rule accomplishes the intended objectives. This 
determination would include an analysis, for example, of whether a benign 
provision on its face may have substantial risk that the NLRB will label it 
a pretext for an improper motive to chill, coerce, or prohibit self-
organizing, protected activities.  
Below is a chart that depicts the spreadsheet columns. 
 
COMPREHENSIVE 
STUDENT-
ATHLETE 
ACTIONS TO BE 
REGULATED 
 
SECTION 7 
PROTECTED 
ACTIVITY 
(Y/N) 
 
DRAFT 
LANGUAGE 
WITHOUT 
SANCTIONS 
 
DISCIPLINARY 
SANCTIONS 
 
PRO-CON 
AND 
LITIGATION 
RISK 
 
Itemize each factual 
circumstance 
    
 
It is worth reiterating that this model’s success is mostly dependent on 
the ability of drafters to anticipate as many negative scenarios as possible, 
such as institutional actions that prompt pushback from a collection of 
students. Even the unsubstantiated appearance of impropriety may give 
rise to common complaints and grievances among student-athletes and 
then, to the point of this Article, the use of social media and other activities 
to address the concern collectively.  
1. Multiple Legal Subject Sources for Protected Rights and 
Liabilities 
Legal imagination also is required to finalize the modeling of rules and 
policies. A handbook with social media rules and broad policies for 
communications and activities of the student-athletes has potential legal 
pitfalls beyond labor laws. Class action lawsuits involving former and 
current student-athletes have occurred regarding publicity rights and 
antitrust law.378 Successes for those student-athletes to date are likely to 
embolden athletes to mobilize on other legal issues. Schools need to 
rethink and redraft rules because these cutting-edge legal issues are 
                                                                                                             
 378. See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F. Supp 3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015) (discussing 
publicity rights victories for former student-athletes in Keller and Hart and 
antitrust limitations imposed on the NCAA and member institutions). 
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redefining the relationship between students-athletes and the schools for 
which they perform.  
Well-drafted compilation of rules and policies should incorporate the 
legal principles of various potential causes of action. Each area of law 
impacts the rights of the parties and the rules that govern those rights. The 
causes of action all represent ways in which the law defines those 
relationships. Each cause of action shows the competing interests of the 
athlete versus the institution. Therefore, a state-of-the-art social media and 
student-athlete activities rule should balance the interests of both parties. 
The recent litigation highlights volatile student interests ripe for future 
court challenges, which emanate from student-athletes who feel wronged 
by a prohibition from college handbook rules and which are rooted in the 
following competing interests: (1) publicity rights of student-athletes; (2) 
First Amendment rights of both parties; (3) antitrust law limitations on the 
right of institutions to prevent student-athletes from profiting from their 
own NILs; and (4) the employee status of student-athletes. 
Two examples, which are interrelated but legally distinct theories, are 
particularly noteworthy. Both examples involve the claim by student-
athletes that they should be able to profit from their NILs. As applied to 
social media and student activity prohibitions by schools, if the schools 
ignore the direction provided by the courts as to the rights of student-
athletes, they face the danger of creating rules and polices that unlawfully 
abridge those rights.  
2. Student-Athlete Publicity Rights  
One issue is whether a scholarship athlete’s publicity rights, that is, 
the rights to profit from his NIL, renders an NCAA or school rule 
unenforceable if it prevents the student-athlete from using social media to 
profit from his NIL.  
Federal circuits have ruled twice that former student-athletes can have 
publicity rights that trump the First Amendment rights of the NCAA and 
its agents.379 In both cases, however, the court adopted a “transformative 
use test” that balanced whether the use by the unauthorized user of a 
player’s NIL “transformed” the NIL rather than merely recreated it.380 In 
                                                                                                             
 379. See Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 2010 WL 530108, affirmed sub. nom. In re 
NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th 
Cir. 2013); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013).  
 380. See Roger M. Groves, “Can I Profit from My Own Name and Likeness as 
a College Athlete?” The Predictive Legal Analytics of a College Player’s 
Publicity Rights vs. First Amendment Rights of Others, 48 INDIANA L. REV 369, 
390–404 (2015) (discussing the Transformative Use Test as employed in both 
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both cases, the evidence was critical to the determination. Differing facts 
could bring different results.381  
The hypotheticals in this Article involved a player using Facebook or 
Twitter to send images to teammates and the public. The player obviously 
would be using his NIL if he receives public acclaim from such items as a 
signature headband, hairstyle, or tattoos. The player also may decide to 
use his NIL when encouraging teammates to mobilize around issues such 
as concussions, abusive practice schedules, or the need for more flexibility 
to schedule important classes. A rule that flatly prohibits all social media 
posts or other content creation by a scholarship player because of the First 
Amendment rights of the school may be unlawful. The activities in the 
hypothetical probably are organizing activities protected under Section 7 
of the NLRA.  
Competing interests are important to the rule formulation because 
Keller and Hart do not restrict the ability of student-athletes to create or 
distribute NIL content through social media. The well-conceived rule 
should consider that the NIL rights of the player are superior to the 
school’s First Amendment rights, unless the school or third party has a 
transformative use. The rule, therefore, should include language that 
protects the player’s NIL rights. Conversely, based on the knowledge of 
those two cases, the drafter should define the uses that are sufficiently 
transformative to authorize limitations on student-athlete social media 
posts.  
3. Antitrust Limitations on the NCAA and Member Institutions  
In O’Bannon, the Ninth Circuit opined that NCAA D-1 institutions 
could retain earnings from the NIL of student-athletes in trust for when 
their eligibility expires as long as the disbursement is tethered to 
educational purposes.382 In the court’s view, agreements between the 
NCAA and member institutions to prevent student-athletes from ever 
receiving proceeds from the use of their NIL’s was an unreasonable 
restraint of trade.383  
The importance of balancing competing interests in drafting is akin to 
the balancing of interests performed by a court. In O’Bannon, the court 
balanced the interests of both parties.384 The standard used by the court 
                                                                                                             
cases); Keller, 2010 WL 530108, at *3–4; Hart, 717 F.3d 141; see also discussion 
of these cases supra Part VI.C.  
 381. See supra notes 379–380 and accompanying text.  
 382. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1078.  
 383. See id. 
 384. See id. at 1059. 
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compares the procompetitive effects of such a school rule with the rule’s 
anticompetitive effects.385 The relevance is that this Article’s model for 
drafting student-athlete rules and policies also should balance respective 
interests. If the rule that restricts the communications and activities of the 
student-athlete is anticompetitive without sufficient pro-competitive 
justification, the rule may be unlawful on antitrust grounds even if the rule 
could withstand labor law scrutiny.386 
VII. APPLICATION BEYOND STUDENT-ATHLETES 
The issues discussed herein are not as narrow as they seem. Although 
this Article focuses on student-athletes, the NLRB’s Office of the General 
Counsel has applied employee status to medical residents and paid 
graduate students as well.387 The NLRB’s actions are in response to a 
growing movement of graduate students seeking bargaining power at their 
respective institutions.388 
Even since the General Counsel disseminated the GCM, graduate 
students have advocated for multiple bargaining units within university 
departments.389 The lead case regarding this advocacy is Yale University 
and Unite Here Local 33.390 Yale University is a significant case because 
it is one of the first to follow Columbia University, and it provides 
guidance on how the Board will apply the holding that students are 
statutory employees.391 In Yale University, the union sought to represent 
nine different bargaining units within nine different departments.392 The 
                                                                                                             
 385. See id. at 1078–79. 
 386. A more detailed modeling of how to balance these competing interests in 
future NCAA or member institutions rules is beyond the scope of this Article. It 
is, rather, the subject of a forthcoming companion article. That article also will 
discuss unanswered questions from the NLRB pronouncements discussed in this 
Article. The author recognizes, for example, that the NLRB pronouncements 
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Board granted that request, directing separate elections for each of the 
units.393 In so holding, the Board rejected Yale’s two-pronged contention 
that the Columbia University decision was wrong and that even under 
Columbia University, teaching fellows were distinguishable from student-
assistants and thus were not statutory employees.394  
The Board’s rationale provides greater assurance that Columbia 
University is viable and, therefore, so do both the GCM and Advice 
Memorandum that follow Columbia University as controlling precedent. 
Yale argued, as did Northwestern, that the educational relationship 
excluded employee status for student-workers.395 The Board reaffirmed 
that, under the common law definition of employee, the employment 
relationship co-exists with an educational relationship.396  
Thus, the most recent iterations of Columbia University foretell both 
a growing list of union classifications among student-workers and a 
growing list of separate bargaining units at the institution. Yale, for 
example, has over 800 teaching fellows and 56 academic curricula that 
offer Ph.D. programs.397 Future courts may analyze requests for multiple 
bargaining units within departments at Yale and other private institutions 
of higher learning by the same broad common law definition of employee 
and community of interest standard. There is the very real potential for 
similar mobilizing efforts by student-workers at other schools.  
In Yale University, the Board also decided an issue with implications 
for the D-1 athletic programs at private schools. The Board determined 
that there was a sufficient “community of interest” among teaching fellows 
in each of the nine departments to justify a separate bargaining unit for 
each of the departments.398 The factors analyzed to make that 
determination involved whether the proposed unit members had distinct 
skills, training, and functions from other classifications of employees.399 
Significantly, the Board emphasized that Yale bore the burden of 
establishing a lack of a community of interest.400  
The application of multiple bargaining units to an athletic program is 
a game yet to be played and may have unanticipated repercussions. Under 
certain circumstances, the NCAA allows students who have graduated 
from one school to transfer and play an additional year at another 
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program.401 What if two or more transfer graduate students believe the new 
school is treating them unfairly relative to other multi-year scholarship 
players? If they wanted to organize separately from those students who have 
multi-year scholarships, would the Board decide they had a sufficiently 
distinct community of interest to establish their own bargaining unit? What 
about those students who have partial scholarships? The schools have the 
burden of convincing the Board that non-scholarship student-athletes’ skills, 
training, and oversight are common to all other scholarship athletes, and the 
schools appear to possess the better argument when compared to the Board’s 
argument. That too is a legal analysis for another article. 
From the student-athlete’s perspective, smaller units can be advantageous. 
Obviously, no union exists until a requisite number of eligible people cast 
affirmative votes,402 but, as a general proposition, the smaller the group to 
organize, the easier it can be to assemble. In more visceral terms, getting a small 
number of people to agree is easier to achieve than getting a larger number to 
agree. If one of the above groups meets the community of interest standard, 
getting requisite votes in an election may be achievable.  
In February 2017, one month after the Board decided Yale University, six 
academic departments at Yale University voted to join graduate student union 
Local 33.403 Yale University challenged the legality of department-by-
department union elections.404 The NLRB dismissed the challenge, despite 
Yale reportedly hiring high-powered outside counsel known for anti-union 
representation, Proskauer Rose LLP.405 At the time of this Article, the NLRB 
left unresolved eligibility questions. According to Dan Bowling, labor 
professor at Duke School of Law, “Local 33 will likely seek to begin the 
bargaining process with Yale as soon as possible.”406 
The Yale controversy is also just one exhibit in a growing trend. A link 
can exist between social activism and self-organizing activity protected under 
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Section 7. Some socially engaged graduate students might have heightened 
self-awareness of what they perceive to be inequities imposed by the 
institution upon working graduate students. The graduate student-workers 
may use their activism to mobilize for a cause. That mobilization implicates 
Section 7 protections and any institutional policies affecting their actions. 
As to the activism, respected publications have noticed the trend. The 
Wall Street Journal chronicled the uptick in protests among graduate business 
schools, despite often being the “quietest quad in times of turbulence.”407 
Regarding campus politics, Peter Johnson, Dean of the M.B.A. program at the 
University of California, Berkeley, observed, “I can’t remember a time when 
our graduate students have been as involved.”408 Harvard Business School, 
University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business, and the University of 
Pennsylvania’s Wharton School experienced student protest marches, 
fundraisers, and participation in political debates in reaction to President Donald 
Trump’s positions on immigration and environmental regulation.409 Some of 
those students may turn their focus from others to themselves. Likely, some 
of the protesting students will learn to employ Section 7 to protect their rights 
to act collectively for their mutual benefit if they fall within the employment 
setting described in this Article. The Wall Street Journal article’s author 
termed this level of student engagement “a new reality.”410 The comment 
corroborates the point that organizing activities at the collegiate level, even if 
initially rooted in social activism, cuts across a sufficiently broad swath of 
students to justify heightened attention by private colleges and universities 
and the attorneys who represent them. Some of the best practice models in 
this Article may have application for other categories of student workers in 
the near future.  
CONCLUSION 
Private colleges and universities should reexamine their rules and policies 
and establish new paradigms to meet the challenge of NLRB pronouncements 
that student-athletes are employees under the National Labor Relations Act. 
Fortunately, Northwestern University has provided the test case for antiquated 
rules found to be unlawful under Section 7 of the Act while also furnishing 
curative language that assists other private colleges and universities in 
navigating the new legal minefield.  
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Hypotheticals in this Article sensitized the reader to the wide range of 
circumstances currently without legal resolution when institutions draft rules 
and policies regulating student-athlete social media expressions and other 
activities off the court or field. Student-athlete use of social media and self-
organizing activities are trending, not passing, and there may be grave 
consequences to the institution.  
The Article also highlights the complexity of drafting a comprehensive 
set of rules and policies for student-athletes with application to multiple 
categories of student workers. A confluence of cases have generated myriad 
competing interests that protect the rights of college athletes rooted in antitrust 
law, publicity rights law, and now, labor law. Best practices in drafting should 
include a systematic, multi-layered build-out of rule provisions. Such a build-
out should incorporate the rights of both parties from the recent caselaw and 
NLRB pronouncements.  
Best practices also should instill a process that triggers the imagination to 
anticipate increased social media activism and other self-organizing activities 
by student-athletes. Drafters then should reexamine existing rules and 
policies, fully cognizant of the broad definition of self-organizing activities 
for mutual aid and protection under Section 7 of the Act. Finally, the Article 
advocates proactive efforts of institutions to cure potential ills before the ills 
become fatal. The drafting squeeze is worth the juice. 
